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ABSTRACT 
November 1990, with the stepping down of Singapore's inaugural Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, saw the changing of the guard in Singapore, together with 1he 
promise of a more consultative style of government and greater citizen participation. 
However, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) had been quick to point out that the 
new openness did not mean that they would tolerate undue criticisms of the government. 
Participants in political discussions are thus constrained by the Out-of-bounds 
markers (OB markers) which dictate the rules of political engagement and the topics 
which are deemed by the PAP as too sensitive for public debate. The OB markers are 
not a defined set of rules, and evolve with the prevailing socio-political climate. 
The OB markers have been in existence long before it was brought into the 
limelight in 1994, when a Singaporean author was chastised by the PAP for two critical 
political commentaries published in the press. The Singaporean government has 
justified the need for OB markers in maintaining national security and religious and 
n:.cial harmony. 
Although Singaporean academics have mentioned the OB markers in their work, 
there has 0een no extensive study performed on the topic. This thesis aims to explore 
the conditions which have infonned the need for OB markers and its implementation in 
the local press, using The Straits Times as a case study. The thesis will also discern if 
there has been a shift in these markers using the public discussion of the Marxist 
Conspiracy, the Catherine Lim incident and the Ong Presidency as test cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the subject of Out-of-bounds (OB) 
markers which have been mentioned and alluded to in writings on politics and social 
control in the city state of Singapore. The OB markers (in golfing parlance, a set of 
coloured flags cordoning off an area where golfers are not permitted to enter) basically 
refer to the boundaries of political and social discussion which the Singapore 
government has no hesitation in voicing its displeasure when they are breached. The 
application of the tenn in a political context seems to be a uniquely Singaporean 
occurrence since only local politicians and writers have used this term in reference to 
these unwritten rules of social-political discourse. 
Local writer Dr Catherine Lim became the cause celebre of the OB markers 
debate in 1994. Lim had strayed into the realm of political commentary in her article 
when she speculated about an apparent contest of styles within the government of 
Singapore, between Lee Kuan Yew's sterner stand and Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong's "kinder, gentler'' approach (George, :2000, p.41). The PAP took Lim's comment 
on "one government, two styles" to mean that Prime Minister Gob was not in charge of 
governance (Low, 1998, p.61). 
Lim was rebuked by the Prime Minister's office, and was told to fulfil her 
political potential by joining a political party. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew was also 
of the view that such "poison darts" must be stopped and that the Pdme Minister should 
not hesitate to take on anyone who challenges him so that his authority and office will 
not be mocked (Low, 1998, p.62). 
A critic of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), veteran opposition party 
member J. B. Jeyaretnam, argued that the OB markers and other such unwritten rules 
are undemocratic and unconstitutional (Lee, 1999). Jeyaretnam pointed out that Article 
14 of the Singapore Constitution ensures the rights of all Singaporean citizens to 
freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. 
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The government countered however, saying that the same article empowered 
them to impose restrictions if the exercise of those rights threatened national security, 
relations with other countries, public order, morality, or if it was in contempt of court, 
defamatory and incited violence (Lee, 1999). 
Political activist James Gomez (2000, p.71) states that the presence of OB 
markers and the censorial nature of the republic severely restricts the cultivation of a 
politically active civil society, and inadvertently leads to self-censorship. Voices of 
dissent are muffled under the tid .. : of creature comforts and the good life which the PAP 
has managed to provide for Singaporeans. As long as Singapore, the "nanny-state" 
(Gomez, 2000, p.72) provides the necessary environment for economic growth, the 
people are content. The materialist pragmatism of Singaporeans has left most of them 
politically apathetic, or unwilling to risk their livelihood in disagreeing with the 
government. 
In the same vein, fanner Straits Times journalist Cherian George has tem1ed 
Singapore the "Air-Conditioned Nation", because the republic is "a society with a 
unique blend of comfort and central control, where people have mastered their 
environment, but at the cost of individual autonomy" (George, 2000, p.l5}. Comfort is 
the means through which control is achieved by the PAP. Picking up on the air-
conditioner metaphor, the OB markers are thus a thermostat to ensure that the heat of 
political debate does not reach an uncomfortable level. 
Some observers questioned whether Dr Catherine Lim had broken these 
unwritten rules, and found it hard to accept that someone as eloquent as her had crossed 
the line between observer and participant. Legal scholar Walter Woon had, in a different 
context, called the catch-all definitions employed in the laws as "driftnet laws", which is 
a legislative net that enables the government to trawl a whole ocean of eventualities and 
throw back whatever it was not interested in (George, 2000, p.43). 
The message that seemed to have been sent out to the rest of the population was 
that they would not stand a chance if they were to comment on the PAP and its policies, 
since a polished communicator like Catherine Lim had misfired in her attempt. 
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Engaging in political debate was ther~fore an extremely risky undertaking best left to 
those who felt well equipped (or were foolhardy enough) to wade into the murky waters. 
Ho Khai Leong, a senior lecturer in political science in Singapore, states that the 
uniqueness of Singapore's public policy can be best explained when it is viewed in the 
proper strategic, political, economic and social contexts of the city-state. 
Misunderstandings and misconceptions about Singapore often arise from ignoring these 
factors. A consideration of these variables is important for analysis in order to find 
middle ground between the ideal and reality (Ho, 2000, p.l2). 
This statement, it seems, reflects the general consensus among Singaporean 
scholars and politicians that most overseas (and some local) critics and observers tend to 
view Singapore's policies within an a-historical frame"-,..ork. 
The various social and political factors that have infonned Lee Kuan Yew and 
his People's Action Party of the need to restrict public debate and the media will be 
explored in Chapter One. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly mentioned that 
the Western-style democracies and press systems cannot be universally applied because 
each country has its own distinct history and pa.th to development. The most explicit 
statement of his beliefs can be found in his two-vclmue autobiography, which will be 
drawn upon in this thesis, as well as Lee Kuan Yew: The man and his ideas (Han et al., 
1997). 
The unique circumstances surrounding Singapore's establishment as a sovereign 
state, such as a lack of natural resources and her mainly multiracial population, 
presented the PAP with a formidable task of making the nation thrive a..1d prosper. The 
insensitiv~ reporting in the 1950s which led to chaos made it clear that harmonious 
interracial relations had to be maintained, and hence an OB marker was planted on 
racially inflammatory issues. 
Chapter Two briefly describes the removal of communist and foreign influence 
in the Singaporean press during the 1970s. The existence of several laws such as the 
Internal Security Act and the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act - some of which 
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were legacies of British press control - (Chua, 1998, p.l46) played a major part in 
bringing the local newspapers to the heels of the government. 
The Straits Times, Singapore's oldest newspaper, eventually chose to adhere to 
the OB markers and government policies for the sake of survival. Its history to 1995 has 
been comprehensively explored in C.M. Turnbull's Dateline Singapore. Now tasked 
with the mission to 'inform, educate and entertain', one of its columnists Chua Lee 
Hoong points out that the current editors "do not accept that being anti-establishment is 
a newspaper's only path to greatness and glory" (Chua, 1998, p.147). Chua is of the 
opinion that the Singaporean press is not, and should not be "a secular hound of heaven 
barking at the heels of the govenunent to keep it in line" (Chua, 1998, p.l47). Moreover, 
she points out that the American media model works on the assumption that 
governments are inherently corrupt, and therefore need a watchdog to prevent abuses of 
power. One can see the incompatibility between the Western press model and Lee Kuhlt 
Yew's Confucianist view (that all sectors of a nation are subordinate to the govenunent, 
and it in tum has the moral obligation to be corruption-free) of what the press should be. 
The third chapter seeks to ascertain ifthere has been a shift in the OB markers in 
the years following Lee Kuan Yew's stepping down as Prime Minister, and to see if PM 
Gob's promise of a 'kinder, gentler' govenunent had been fulfilled. A qualitative 
analysis will be perfonned on articles draw:: from The Straits Times concerning t!.~ 
Marxist Conspiracy, the Catherine Lim and the Ong Presidency cases. These cases have 
been chosen because they span a length of time which saw Lee Kuan Yew as Prime 
Minister (in 1987), and eight years into Goh Chok Tong's tenure as PM of Singapore 
(1999). For e,,, J r-ase, the areas put under &crutiny include: firstly, depth of the 
discussion and commentary from the reporters; secondly, presence of altern:J.tive points 
of view or concerns raised; thirdly, editorial comments; and lastly, responses from the 
public to the Forum pages. 
This thesis is meant to be a primer on the subject of OB markers, enabling the 
reader to knowledgably follow up on further discussions. It hopes to achieve tlrree 
objectives: the first is shed light what the OB markers are. The second objective is to 
explain where they came from, and the third objective is to discern if there has been a 
shift towards a widening of the OB markers. I believe that this work is an original 
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contribution to writings on Singaporean policy-making, since OB markers have only 
been alluded to in current work, and there is no dedicated text on this subject. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Tbe Road to on Markers 
Overview of the OB Markers Issue 
The 'Out of bounds markers' or 'OB markers' in short, are defined in golfing 
terms as stakes or fence poles which define the boundaries of play within a golf course. 
When a ball is launched beyond these boundaries, it is forfeit from the game (USGA, 
2002). A search over the Internet yields results either relating to the game of golf or to 
Singaporean politics with the term adopting another meaning when applied to the 
Singaporean context. 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's first Prime Minister and an avid 
golfer, used this term to refer to topics which were considered too sensitive to be 
discussed publicly- such as matters touching on race or religion. However, these OB 
markers reach further. With them the rules of political engagement have been defined. 
Often citing Singapore's multiracial, multireligious makeup, Lee makes no apologies 
for his tough stance on silencing those who would breach the OB markers and 
compromise the nation's stability or attack the government and its fitness to rule. 
Ho (2000, p.l86) states: 
IP. political discussions, Singaporeans are constrained by what the 
governing elite called the 'Out of bound markers' or OB markers in 
short. OB markers refer to issues that are too sensitive to be discussed in 
public for fear of destabilizing or jeopardizing public peace and 
order ... and racial issues are within this parameter of OB marker. 
Although Lee Kuan Yew had used this term before prior to the 1990s, OB 
markers were frequently brought up in public debate during that decade. The 1990s saw 
Singapore basking in its wealth as a result of over 30 years of meticulous government 
planning, as well as the emergence of a more politically savvy section of the population. 
These young men and women had never lived through the trauma of the Japanese 
occupation nor experienced the tumultuous years of the fight for independence and 
communal rioting. Influenced by Western liberal democratic ideals, they fonn a major 
part of the new civil society th<~.t has emerged in the city-state. 
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Their participation in Singaporean politics had been greeted with caution and 
some suspicion by the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), which has held the reins for 
37 years since the country's independence in 1965. Birch (1993, p.7) points out that 
they seem to be wary of Gresham's Law of culture where 'good' values wili be driven 
out by the 'bad'. Lee has always held the view that Singapore, and any other Asian 
country, has evolved differently from the Western nations. Where Western institutions 
have had the luxury of centuries for their evolution, Asian nations were exp0c•ed to put 
in place already mature institutions the moment their colonial masters depart~d. Hence, 
according to the PAP, the ways of the West are not the ways for Singapore, given the 
unique circumstances surrounding the development of either side. 
It comes as no surprise then, that when Singapore's new civil society comes up 
with ideas deemed too radical by the PAP, the former would often be reminded by the 
latter that transplanting foreign ideas into Singaporean society is not only unwise, but 
could have dire consequences. The OB markers are thus usefili for keeping arguments 
and debates thrown up in public within a corral, where the PAP could easily step in 
should the discussions offend their sensitivities, or those of any ethnic or religious 
group. 
While the Singaporean population at large is accepting of the idea that 
boundaries exist in socio-political discourse, many are uncomfortable with the fact that 
these boundaries seem to be arbitrary and lack definition. Owing to the innate 'kiasu' 
(afraid to lose) and 'kiasi' (afraid to die) mentality of many Singaporeans, they would 
like to have in their hands a map with which they could chart the course of their 
arguments, and avoid falling foul of the PAP. 
Many have called on the PAP to set a 'once-and-for-all' definition on where the 
08 markers lie. The PAP, on the other hand, is reluctant to do so for the fear of opening 
loopholes which could be exploited (George, 2000, p.43). This reluctance in tum 
generates a feeling of disconcertment among those who feel that the government can 
come down on anyone for any reason at all since the 'rules' are so arbitrary. 
The issue of OB markers cannot be seen a-historically by taking it on'.y in its 
current context and assessed through the eyes of a Western liberal democrat. Indeed, Ho 
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(2000, p.12) remarks that misconceptions about Singapore often arise from ignoring tne 
country's strategic, political, historical, economic and social contexts. These factors 
relevant to OB markers will be discussed in the following sections, and are necessary in 
order to assess the issue in its proper place. 
Singapore's First Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew 
Lee Kuan Yew has always been sceptical of the idea of a free press and of the 
marketplace of ideas. He says that his early experiences in Singapore and Malaya 
shaped his views about the claim of the press to be the defender of truth and freedom of 
speech. To Lee, the freedom of the press was the freedom of its owners to advance their 
personal and class interests (Lee, 2000, p.l86). 
Far from sorting the irresponsible from the responsible and rewarding the latter, 
Lee states that the "American concept of the 'marketplace of ideas', instead of 
producing enlightenmeTlt, has time and again led to riots and bloodshed" (Han et al., 
1997, p.213). He would often quote the incidences of racial rioting in Singapore's early 
years to rebuke this concept. 
Rejecting the notion of the press as the Fourth Estate, Lee asks pointedly, "who 
elects the members of the press? On whose authority did they speak? Who gave them 
the mandate?" (Han et a!., 1997, p.212). Since those in the journalistic profession have 
not been nominated by the people, Lee's stand is that journalists do not have the right or 
the role to lead the country in directions contrary to those set by the elected leaders. He 
says that "freedom of the press, freedom of the news media, must be subordinated to the 
overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore, and to the primacy of purpose of an 
elected government" (Turnbull, 1995, p.293). 
Western liberals have argued that a completely unfett·~red press will expose 
corruption and make for clean, honest government. However, Lee points out that the 
11ninhibited and freewheeling press and television in India, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
South Korea, and Japan have not stopped the pervasive and deeply embedded 
corruption in these countries (2000, p.166). 
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As opposed to tearing down the credibility of the government, Lee insists that 
the press in Singapore should play a supportive role in nation building for the good of 
the general populace. He states that "the mass media can create a mood in which people 
become keen to acquire the knowledge, skills and discipline of advanced countries. 
Without these, we can never hope to raise the standard of living for our people" 
(Turnbull, 1995, p.293). Taking all ofthese factors into consideration, Lee feels that the 
PAP has every right to seek a mandate to curtail press freedom when it was used 
unfairly to criticise the government or destabilise the country. 
On the OB markers, Lee states in no uncertain tenns that only those who are 
elected can set the boundaries: "'lf you want to move the OB markers, then you come 
out (into politics) and persuade the electorate" (Ng, 1995b). When posed the question if 
the electorate could set the OB markers, Lee's response was lilat the people could not 
spontaneously move without leaders who could pose alternatives and crystallise their 
differing opinions (Ng, 1995b). It would seem that the ultimate decisions still lie in the 
hands of the ruling party. 
Lee Kuan Yew asserts that the American mistake was to assume the universality 
of its systems and values. After the Singapore government restricted the sale of the 
Asian Wall Street Journal in 1987 for failing to grant it the right of reply, the US State 
Department sent an aide·memoir to the Singaporean Foreign Affairs Ministry deploring 
such a move. The US argued that the press should have the right to publish what it 
chooses, however irresponsible or biased its actions might seem (Ministry of 
Communications and Information, 1987, p.6). 
The logic of Silch an argument was that the marketplace of ideas would weed out 
the undesirable. Lee says that the US model was not a universal standard, and the media 
in different countries play different roles. These roles are born from differing political 
and historical experiences. Though different from the US in terms of execution and 
philosophy, they represent equally valid functions which the press fulfils in different 
environments. Lee adds that it is quite unlikely that the idea of an adversarial press, free 
to print as it sees fit, would find much sympathy in Singapore (Han et al., 1997, p.217). 
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Lee Kuan Yew views himself as a pragmatic person, not an ideologue set in his 
ways. He says that what guides him is reason and reality. Hence, Lee asserts that he has 
never been one to adhere to the ''pet theories" of experts and quasi-experts, especially 
academics in the social and political sciences. !..ee stresses; "I always tried to be correct, 
not politically correct" (Lee, 2000, p.688). 
Despite the numerous spats between Lee Kuan Yew and the Western liberals, it 
would appear that what he wants is the right of reply to 'unfair' commentary made 
about the city-state, and for the West to adopt a 'live and let live' attitude towards the 
Singapore press and government. 
The Republic of Singapore 
It is important to point out that Singapore is not a democracy, but a republic. 
While the tenn 'democracy' has become a catch-all tenn for a political system whereby 
the government is elected by the people, there are fundamental differences between a 
democracy and a republic. 
Gary McLeod, a US republican running for Congress, indicates that a republic is 
representative government ruled by law, whereas a democracy is direct government 
ruled by the majority (McLeod, n.d.). In other words, a republican government is 
elected by the people who put their trust on the ruling party to decide what is best for 
them on their behalf, according to what is stipulated in the Constitution. On the other 
hand, a democratic govenunent is elected by the people who expect the ruling party to 
act according to what the majority wants. 
It is no wonder - given the PAP's style of government - that independent 
Singapore was founded as a republic. It is vital to note this fact because it helps an 
observer, whc may be a democra1., to understand why the PAP's policies seem to fly in 
the face of 'democracy'. The republican fonn of government is also best suited to Lee's 
philosophy that time and resources are wasted when trying to accommodate the 
conflicting voices in a community. 
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The PAP and Modern Singapore 
Historian Raj Vasil (2000, p.17) is of the opinion that the PAP, which has ruled 
Singapore without interruption since 1959, "has detennined the entire nature and course 
of politics and the direction of socio-economic change in the country. It views itself and 
is seen by many Singaporeans as the unchallenged national party". 
At the helm of the PAP is the charismatic Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew -
prime theoretician, spokesperson and architect of the city-state, and first Prime Minister 
of Singapore. 
However, modem Singapore also owes much to her British colonial masters, 
who had ruled the country benignly for over 140 years. Without the founding of modem 
Singapore by Sir Thomas Stamford Ra~fles in 1819, the island would never have been 
able to reach her full potential. 
Eight years later in 1827 it was joined with Malacca and Penang to form the 
Straits Settlements, administered by the British East India Company until 1858. The 
British government assumed direct responsibility over the settlements in 1867, and was 
interrupted by the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 during the Second World 
War. When the British returned in 1945, they did not intend to stay. Instead, they 
worked towards sowing the seeds of self-govermnent and democracy by transferring 
power to Singapore in stages. Singapore became a crown colony, separated from 
Malaya on 1 April1946 (Sie, 1997, p.77). 
When Malaya was granted independence in 1954, Singapore achieved internal 
self-government in 1955 with David Mar:Jhall, leader of the Singapore Labour Front 
(SLF), as the Chief Minister. The SLF was formed in July 1954, and was generally a 
wtited party. rlowever, the People's Action Party, formed in November 1954 under the 
leadership of young lawyer Lee Kuan Yew, was not a united party. It was an alliance 
between social democrats and pro-communists. As a result, the PAP was more left-
oriented than the SLF (Sie~ 1997, p.78). The communist elements and their 
syrnpathisers were subsequently flushed out. In May 1959, Singapore acquired full self-
governing status, with the PAP winning 43 out of 51 seats, and Lee Kuan Yew became 
the Prime Minister (Lee, 1998, p.305). 
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In September 1963, Singapore became part of the Federation of Malaysia. With 
this, Singapore achieved complete decolonisation, but not independence. Lee Kuan Yew 
had worked hard to get Singapore in as a member of the Federation, believing that 
Singapore's only way to survive was to tap the resources of the hinterland of Peninsula 
Malaysia. The merger was unsuccessful, mainly owing to Malaysia's fear and suspicion 
of Lee Kuan Yew's policies and of dominance by the numerically superior Chinese 
population. On the 9th of August, 1965, Singapore was cast out of the Federation and 
left to fend for herself, having independence "thrust upon" her (Vasil, 2000, p.3). 
The PAP adopted a management-by-objective (MBO) approach in the 
administration of the new country. It was a do-or-die situation for the young nation. 
Unemployment had to be dealt with, the economy improved and hostile neighbours 
placated. National service was introduced and patriotism was inculcated in schools. 
With the single-minded determination to survive, let alone prosper, the PAP began to 
rule in an increasingly paternalistic manner. Critics would say the hubris of success had 
swollen the collective heads of the PAP politicians, and in tum lead to strict~r 
censorship against all who would oppose them. 
Corporate Singapore's Management by Objective (MBO) 
This su-::cess has been partly attributed to the PAP's strategy of running 
Singapore like a corporation. "Singapore Incorporated" is a tenn that has been used to 
describe Singapore's economic modus operandi. As Ho (2000, p.15) points out, "the 
nature of the Singapore state since independence has been variously described as ... soft-
authoritarian, semi-autocratic ... corporatist. .. and illiberal". Or as Salaff (1988, p.19) 
says, "of the various approaches to the formation of state social policy, the most clearly 
applicable to Singapore is cotporatism". 
Singapore could operate as a cotporation only if the ruling party had the 
necessary functional organizational structure in place. Salaff (1988, p.21) points out that 
"the party-state mobilizes and co-0pts interest groups in support of its development 
policies by reorganizing the major social and economic factions into large corporate 
collectives". In addition, "the key to state leadership in Singapore's development 
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program is the extensive network of semi-autonomous statutory boards and state 
corporation responsible to the Cabinet" (Salaff, 1988, p.2l). 
Since the PAP leadership is able to run Singapore as if they were the Board of 
Directors, the PAP has unswervingly used MBO as its operating tactic. And the 
objective is the unhindered progress towards national unity, development and economic 
prosperity. To achieve all these, the mass media, especially the press, has been singled 
out to be the instrument of state policy. 
Developmental 'Kiasuism'- Singapores Unique Ideology 
The term 'ldasu' originated from the Hokkien dialect, one of the most 
commonly used dialects spoken by the Singaporean Chinese. Literally meaning 'afraid 
to lose', the term is used to describe the fear of being superseded or rendered obsolete; 
be it in terms of education, employment, or even collecting freebies (Singaporeans are 
infamous for queuing up hours in advance for almost anything on prvmotion). Often 
coupled with 'kiasi' (literally meaning 'afraid 'w die'), another common Singaporean 
trait describing the aversion attracting trouble to one and avoiding it at ail costs, 
'kiasuism' becomes a compelling force for self-preservation at any cost. 
One thing that bears mentioning is that of the cultivation of a 'siege mentality' 
among Singaporeans. The siege mentality views outsiders as competitors, and home is 
the only place that is safe and secure. Its origins reach back to the republic's expulsion 
from the Federation of Malaya as well as the sabre-rattling and war of words which 
Singapore and Malaysia are periodically engaged in. In his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew 
had described Singapore as a Chinese island in a Malay sea (Lee, 1998, p.667). To the 
north and east there is Malaysia; and to the south and west is Indonesia. Both are 
Malay-Muslim countries which possess radically different racial compositions and 
attitudes compared to Singapore. 
The PAP has reiterated time and again the prudence of being prepared for any 
eventuality. In order for that to be possible, the maintenance of what Chomsky (Birch, 
1993, p.ll) calls "necessary illusions" is needed to spur the citizens to rally around the 
ruling party in order to combat the perceived threJt. The introduction of compulsory 
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military national service for Singaporean males is such an example, which had raised 
the ire of Singapore's neighbours. 
While the siege mentality offers a simple explanation as to why the trait of being 
'kiasu' is prevalent in the Sin~aporean mindset, 'kiasuism' or rather 'developmental 
ldasuism', was one of the major factors in Singapore's success. By breaking down the 
city-state's social and political problems into objectives to be met and problems to be 
solved, the PAP could then tackle the seemingly insurmountable mountain of problems 
in a systematic way. 
Singapore's single-minded MBO approach succeeded because Singapore is 
unique as a nation. As Vasil {2000, p.37) writes, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew told 
him in 1968 that Singaporeans '"are of immigrant stock. Having left a richer culture, 
and psychologically more secure past, we have only the future to make something of, 
and that we are determined to do"'. 
A strong and effective goverrunent united in its objective to make the city-state 
is seen as another key ingredient to Singapore's success. On prosperity, it is interesting 
that Confucius, whose thinking has been credited with the political and especially 
economic success of Confucius-inspired Asian countries, had this to say: 
When Confucius went to the state of Wei, he said to a disciple, 'How 
the population has grown!' 
The disciple asked, 'Since they have a large population, what is there to 
add?' 
Confucius said, 'Enrich them'. 
The disciple asked, 'Once they are rich, what else is there to add?' 
Confucius said, 'Educate them.' (Confucius, trans. 1991, p.65) 
So now that Singapore is a wealthy nation - despite of the current economic 
downturn - the government has established the third university, the Singapore 
Management University; and is considering a fourth. These moves are in line with Lee 
Kuan Yew's idea of maximising human resources by educating the citizens. 
The uniqueness of the Singapore experience could also be seen in several ways. 
Vasil (2000, p.35) points out that the PAP differed greatly from other political parties in 
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Southeast Asia., for "it did not allow a wing with its own identity, organization and 
personnel to develop" and "it did not pennit the growth of an alt~rnative competing 
leadership", Bertha Henson of The Straits Times concurs with Vasil, stating that Lee 
Kuan Yew's view is that strong opposition parties ~e not necessary for democracy and 
would only serve to confuse the population (Henson, 2002). 
Vasil (2000, p.35) further states that the PAP "did not consider it necessary to 
create party institutions at the grass-roots level in a way that would allow them to act as 
a link between the government and the people". The PAP relies on 'non-party' 
organizations, such as the Community Centres and the Citizens' Consultative 
Committees which were introduced during the period of the communist threat. This can 
be seen as the PAP's recognition that an 'official' body would have been too 
intimidating for the veople to speak up, and having these 'non-party' organizations 
would put people at ease and in tum facib:ate feedback. 
says: 
Elaborating more on the uniqueness of Singaporean politics, Vasil (2000, p.35) 
Until the mid-1980s, when power began to be transferred to the second 
generation leadership, there had been little open competition for ideas 
and views within the party, all initiative and decision making remained 
largely a preserve of Lee Kuan Yew and his close first generation 
associates ... the party did not give any special attention to routine 
organizational functions, such as recruitment and servicing of members, 
creating and sustaining Jinks with the people at large and creating party 
organization at various levels ... it did not feel the need to create 
effective organizations of its own students, youth, women and so forth 
to mobilize support from those sectors of the population. 
As Ho (2000, p.29) states, the PAP politicians' drive for power is a rational self-
seeking process, "based on the belief that their continuance in power would most benefit 
the nation because of the party's organizational superiority, and their indispensability 
and personal sacrifice for the general good". 
With all these differences and uniqueness, Singapore has opted to go on its own 
way of MBO towards national development and economic growth, and displeasing the 
liberal Western democrats and the Western media is the least of worry for Lee Kuan 
Yew and his like-minded associates. 
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Control as a Colonial Legacy 
Control of the press in Singapore is not as recent a phenomenon as most have 
been led to believe. Turnbul! (1995, p.5) writes that th~ island's pioneering newspaper, 
the Singapore Chronicle, was established in 1824, only a year after the British East 
India Company (EIC) imposed its periodic "Gagging Acts" throughout its territories. 
The EIC was always wary of newspapers- while its main concern was with local-
language newspapers stirring racial disorder in India, it was also resentful of criticisms 
levelled that it from the English presses. The 1823 Act made it mandatory for all 
newspapers to be licensed, and have their materials submitted to authorities for vetting 
before they went to print. In addition to banning all criticism against the E1C, 
scandalous stories about individuals were also disallowed (Turnbull, 1 Q95, p.5). A free 
press in Singapore was not in the minds of British officials stationed there. 
As elsewhere in the British Empire, censorship was used as a means of ensuring 
the credibility of the island's colonial masters, even after the transfer of Singapore from 
British East India Company administration to direct colonial rule in 1867. 
In the years following the Second World War, the British authorities in 
Singapore enacted regulations in June 1948 to inhibit press criticism of official policy 
(Chua, 1998, p.l46). From 1948 to 1960, the Communists were active in Singapore and 
Malaya, engaged in guerrilla warfare against the British and those who were opposed to 
the Malayan Communist Party. By 1952, over 6,000 people, mostly civilians had been 
killed. The Straits Times indicated that this figure equalled to two-thirds of the casualty 
figures of the Boer War, a major military campaign. However, official reports always 
referred to an "emergency"- not a war, and the Communist terrorists were referred to as 
"bandits" in order to deny claims of the existence of a People's Revolutionary Army. 
Turnbull (1995, p.203) adds that the adoption of euphemisms was useful for commercial 
and insurance interests to regard the conflict as an emergency rather than a war. The 
paper cooperated with the government, such as not printing "scoops" which could have 
thwarted security operations. 
Turnbull (1995, p.223) points out that any govenunent's first obligation is to 
provide security, hence Singapore and Malaya inherited the colonia.! legacy of media 
control as a result of the Emergency. As with other developing r:ations, Singapore and 
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Malaya extended their power over the press to encompass wider interests of political 
and social stability, racial harmony, economic efficiency and international goodwill, 
with the New Printing Presses {Applications and Permits) Rules of 1972 being an 
extension of the "Gagging Acts" of 1823. It required printing licenses to be renewed 
annually on the condition that the media owners did not run articles that would threaten 
national security, hurt Singapore~Malaysia ties, and incite communal and racial riots 
(Birch, 1993, p.l7). 
It would seem that if the PAP had its way entirely, the press would be the 
government's voice of state. But whether or not the PAP has its way entirely is a matter 
of opinion~ the PAP certainly allows some dissenting views. Salaff (1988, p.23) says, 
"despite control of dissent, there is still an active, if restrained, political life m 
Singapore". But this state of affairs is regrettable, according to Singh (1992, p.174): 
Unfortunately, the PAP continues to believe that the opposition is 
irrelevant and unnecessary for the political growth and maturity of the 
system ... This would indicate that the PAP government is out of touch 
with the political aspiration of the governed. 
However, Singh had acknowledged the need for restraint in the arena of political 
and religious debate. He said that the "drift towards racialism and communalism was 
considered unfair and dangerous and the PAP could not have been more right when 
Malaysia was afflicted with the 13 May 1969 racial riots" (Singh, 1992, p.156). Lee 
Kuan Yew would often cite the occurrence of these riots as examples as to justify the 
need for tough laws in order to preserve the fabric of Singaporean society. 
Indeed, the sharpest lesson the Singapore presses had learnt was during the 
Maria Hertogh Riots of 11 December 1950, of which The Straits Times was partly 
responsible for the events leading up to the riots (Turnbull, 1995, p.l73). 
The Maria Hertogb Riots: A case study in inflammatory reporting resulting in 
violence 
Maria Bertha Hertogh was born to a Dutch anny sergeant and a Eurasian mother 
and baptised as a Roman Catholic. When the Japanese invaded in 1942, Maria's mother 
entruste1 her to a family friend, Cik Aminah binte Mohamed. Maria's parents were 
subsequently interned and lost contact with Aminah and their five-year~old daughter. 
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Maria's parents returned to Holland after the war, and it was only in 1949 that they 
discovered that Maria was living in Trengganu (on the east coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia), where she was raised as a Muslim and renamed Nadra (Lee, G. B., 1998, 
p.45). At the parent's request, the Dutch consul-general applied to the Singapore court 
for Maria to be transferred to Singapore and put under the charge of the Director of 
Social Welfare. 
Antinah went to court and managed to reverse the decision to return Maria to her 
natural pdrents. She took Maria back and promptly manied her off to a Singapore 
Muslim teacher, Mansoor Adabi. The Dutch consul-general then took out a summons to 
have the marriage voided and custody restored to the parents. On December znd, a judge 
ruled the marriage invalid on the grounds that Maria was only 13 years old. While he 
also acknowledged Maria's wish to remain with her Malayan family, the judge declared 
that her long-tenn future lay with her natural parents. Maria was handed over to her 
mother, who moved into the Convent of the Good Shepherd with her. The judge was 
unwilling to accept any appeals against his decision, insisting that Maria was better off 
starting her new life a quickly as possible. However, an application by Aminah and 
Mansoor was set for hearing the following week (Turnbull, 1995, p.173). 
This seemed to be the perfect human interest story for the English-language 
press. Although The Straits Times did not delve into the personal lives of the rich and 
famous, the paper welcomed sentimenta.l stories about humble folk, such as pretty Asian 
girls eloping with British servicemen. It would run the story for days on end, 
culminating in ''joyful" reconciliation with the tearful family- ideally a widow- in which 
the paper would play the role of peacemaker (Turnbull, 1995, p.l74). 
The press went on a feeding frenzy as the Hertogh story was a journalist's dream 
with all the elements of high dran1a- a long-lost child, distraught parents, a devoted 
foster mother and an ardent young husband. Turnbull (1995, p.l74) point.; out that the 
added attraction for the largely European readership, was of the restoration of an 
innocent young girl to her own culture and religion. As a result, the convent was 
besieged by reporters and photographers. 
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The Dutch consul-general escorted a group of journalists and photographers into 
the convent against the mother's will, with the intention of recording how well Maria 
was settling in. The Straits Times featured a picture of Maria playing dominoes, but the 
other English-language papers were more provocative. For instance, the Singapore 
Standard had on its front page a photo of a smiling Maria, holding hands with the 
Mother superior accompanied by the headline "Bertha Knelt Before Virgin Mary 
Statue". The article pointed out that Maria knelt before the statue on "her own free will" 
(Lee, G. B., 1998, p.45) concluded that she was now ''a carefree child" (Turnbull, 1995, 
p.174). 
The Malay press were incensed the reporting in the English-language papers. 
The Utusan Melayu carried pictures of a weeping Maria with an article headed "Nadra 
Cries and Begs for Utusan Me/ayu Reporter's Help" (Turnbull, 1995, p.174), while 
other Malay papers presented a picture of a bewildered and sad girl parted from her 
foster mother and newly-wed husband (Lee, G. B., 1998, p.45). 
The story of Nadra (as the Malay papers were insistent on calling Maria) 
generated great sympathy in the Muslim community, to the extent that a small group of 
men including radical politicians, like M.A. Abdul Karim Ghani, became Aminah's 
champions. Ghani, who formed the Nadra Action Committee, was the president of the 
Singapore Muslim League and editor-in-chief of two Muslim newspapers. Lee Geok 
Boi says that Ghani's news reports were designed to inflame feelings against the 
Europeans as anti-Muslim (Lee, G. B., 1998, p.45). By early December, feelings in the 
Muslim community were highly charged with strong resentment against the Europeans 
and the way the case was being handled. 
A.E.G. Blades, Assistant Commissioner of the Special Branch, wrote to the 
papers pointing out that Maria's presence in the convent was stirring criticisms and 
strong feelings. The head of the Special Branch warned the Colonial Secretary about the 
anger generated by the press reporting, and suggested that Maria be moved from the 
convent (Turnbull, 1995, p.174). Blades thought it would be prudent to house the girl at 
the York Hill Home, where she was initially placed (Lee, G. B., 1998, p.45). However, 
the Colonial Secretary did not consider such a move necessary. 
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A day before Aminah's appeal was to be heard, Ghani exacerbatc'1 the already 
tense situation by publishing an open letter in Dawn, a Jawi newspaper that he owned. 
Not only was Ghani turning the custody battle into a racial and religious issue, he was 
also trying to portray himself as a martyr for the cause. In the letter he addressed "the 
trinity who will sit in judgment" which included the following statements: 
(T)hough in legal terminology it is Aminah vs. Mrs. Hertogh, before the 
Tribunal of spiritual values it is a case of Muslims vs. Catholics .... 
(B)ecause we Muslims try to follow Christ and Mohamed who came 
after him, we try to be loyal to God and to the King. But, when my duty 
to God demands that to do a thing it does not matter if the King is 
displeased and I have to stand before a modren (sic] Pilate to be 
expelled from Singapore or sent to solitary confinement at the worst. .. I 
take the risk of being hauled up in the Court for contempt of Court for 
my standing up for a claim that the Court in trying to establish its 
prestige should not become guilty of contempt of the higher court of 
humanity and the still higher Court of the Judgment Day. Tomorrow 
you will be Pilates trying NATRA [Nadra] who is imprisoned in a 
convent which though not in law but in fact is a prison ... NATRA 
whom all Muslims regard to-day as either own sister or daughter is 
having Torture of the Heart. To we Orientals, bleeding the Heart of a 
human being is more torturous than the crucifixion of past history. 
(Lee, G. B., 1998, p.46) 
On Monday, December 11, a large Muslim crown had gathered outsidt: the 
Supreme Court to hear the verdict of Aminah's appeal. Carrying banners demanding 
Maria be removed from the convent, the crowd went on a rampage, dragging Europeans 
and Eurasians out of cars, beating them up and killing them (Turnbull, 1995, p.175). 
During the two days of rioting, the Ghurkha Contingent from the anny was called as the 
British felt that the Malay dominated police force would be sympathetic to the Muslim 
rioters (Lee, G. B., 1998, p.46). 
Singapore was put under a week-long curfew, which took three days to restore 
order. At the end of the whole episode, 18 people had been killed, 173 injured, 72 
vehicles burnt out and 199 damaged. Hundreds were arrested mostly for curfew 
breaking, but included a hard core of rioters J:l'ld the members of the Nadra Action 
Committee. 
In the aftermath of the riots, the Progressive Party leader C.C. Tan lashed out at 
the press for "its irresponsible manner and utter disregard of the hatred and passions 
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which they were helping to inflame" (Turnbull, 1995, p.I75). He added that it was no 
wonder the Muslims were infuriated when the pictures and articles coming out every 
day were an affront "even to the minds of the most puerile". Tan further alleged that the 
papers were vying to outdo each other in sensationalist reportin~. and these publications 
"have disclosed the depth of irresponsibility to which the local press would sink" 
(Turnbull, p.175). He warned the press would only have itself to blame if its liberties 
were curt . in the future as a result of these abuses. Lee Kuan Yew agreed with Tan. 
In his memoirs he says that the callousness and sensationalism in the coverage of the 
story by both the Malay and English newspapers served to ignite an already tense 
situation in Singapore (Lee, 1998, p.45). 
The governor appointed a commission of enquiry into the riots, which found that 
the first cause of the riots was putting Maria into a convent as well as the reporting in 
both the English and Malay press. The report expressed regret that the press was 
allowed into the convent, thus provoking the Muslims. 
Turnbull (1995, p.l78) states that the Hertogh Riots taught The Straits Times, 
especially its expatriate staff, a sharp lesson, brought home by the fact that Europeans 
and Eurasians were singled out for attack. The riots revealed that deep racial passions 
below a deceptively calm surface could easily be unleashed by emotional reporting and 
dramatic pictures. From then on, the paper's policy was to tread warily on issues 
involving race and religion. The experience proved a more effective and lasting lesson 
than restrictive legislation. 
The Hertogh Riots was not to be the last racial riot in the history of Singapore 
and Malaysia. In 1964, a sustained campaign in a Malay language newspaper alleged 
that the Chinese majority in Singapore were suppressing the rights of the Malay 
minority. Fighting broke out on July 21, with 36 killed and many more injured (Han et 
al., 1997, p.213). 
The issues of race, religion and language still boil beneath a deceptively calm 
surface. Lee Kuan Yew used to believe that those problems would disappear with higher 
standards of education. However, after observing communal strife in other countries, he 
wonders whether such phenomena will ever disappear (Han et al., 1997, p.213). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the reader with a brief overview of the social and 
political conditions in Singapore. Instead of simply viewing the OB markers as a tool to 
stifle dissent, the incidents of communal rioting, the need to preserve the integrity of a 
multiracial population and a r.:ountry driven by the pure instinct to survive in a hostile 
environment, are factors which have indicated the need for limits to be set in social and 
political discourse. 
Another point that this chapter endeavours to illustrate is that Singapore's road 
to nationhood has been a unique experience - given the city-state's extraordinary 
circumstances, the implementation of 'universal' values such as press freedom may 
prove dangerous. The 'kiasu' mentality of Singaporeans ensures the status quo, since 
failure is too great a risk. 
Chapter Two will examine how the press in Singapore was brought under the 
PAP's wing. In particular, it will focus on the turbulent relationship between The Straits 
Times (Singapore's only major English-language daily) and Lee Kuan Yew in 
Singapore's early years, and how the paper was supposedly brought to heel. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Creation of Consensus 
The first chapter provided a brief socio-political history of Singapore, describing 
some of the factors contributing to the existence of OB markers. This chapter will touch 
on how the press was 'cleaned up' in 1971 with the removal of communist and foreign 
influence from the Singaporean press, and the PAP's current 'consensus politics' 
approach to public administration. 
The implementation of the OB markers would not have been as successful if not 
for the fact that the press in Singapore has to adhere to guidelines set by the government, 
leading to criticisms of the PAP for having beaten the press in Singapore into 
submission and being intolerant to criticisms. The remainder of this chapter will then 
focus on The Straits Times' conflict ridden relationship with the PAP during 
Singapore's early years, and how the paper was brought to toe the government line. 
Singapore's Press Laws 
Lee Kuan Yew had two preoccupations when dealing with the opposition: that 
they were being used by communists, and if they were "black operations" that were 
funded by foreign intelligence agencies to cause mischief (Lee, 2000. p.126). In the 
same vein, Lee is just as careful with regards to the media, in that, in his view, it could 
be used by opposition and foreign groups to influence Singapore's politics. 
Once the PAP government came to power, they passed several laws to mould the 
press into its current supporti role. The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act 
mentioned in the previous chapter ensures that presses in Singapore do not print 
seditious materials under the clause that they would have their licenses revoked if they 
did do. The same act also stipulates that the ownership of media companies must be 
kept in the hands of Singapore citizens, so as to prevent foreign interests from exerting 
influence from the outside. The board of directors for any media organisation must be 
comprised mainly of Singaporeans, with a 3% cap for local shareholders (Ang & Yeo, 
1998, p.393) and a 49% ownership cap for foreign investors in a broadcast station 
(Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts [MIT A], n.d.). 
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The Undesirable Publications Act empowers the authorities to restrict the 
circulation of materials deemed 'obscene' and 'undesirable'. Publications which would 
fall under these categories would include erotic magazines such as Playboy, and books 
which would promote hostility between races and religions, as well as communist 
literature (MIT A, 1967). The Ministry of Infonnation, Communication and the Arts 
(MITA) has jurisdiction on the enforcement of these laws. All journalists also have to 
sign the Official Secrets Act, which prohibits them from communicating sensitive 
government infonnation to foreign nationals (Birch, 1993, p.47). 
Furthennore, most magazines, periodicals, journals and imported books have to 
be vetted by MITA before they are allowed circulation in Singapore. Locally printed 
books are exempt from MITA approval, since the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act 
already regulates the local presses. The ministry also oversees the development of films, 
television and the Internet in the city-state. It is also of interest to note that it plays an 
important role in nation building in Singapore, having commissioned artists to write 
songs instilling a sense of home in the hearts of Singaporeans (MIT A, n.d.). 
Removing Unwanted Influence 
The history ofthe press in Singapore is marked with mergers and amalgamations. 
In 1980 there were 12 daily newspapers printed in the different languages spoken by 
Singaporean:;;. By 1988 only six daily papers remained, two in English, three in 
Mandarin, and one in Tamil (Hachten, 1993, p.73). One company, Singapore Press 
Holdings, now runs the current 7 daily newspapers. Fanned in 1984 by the merging of 
the Times Organisation and Singapore News and Publication Ltd., The Straits Times, 
The New Paper, and The Business Times are the English-language dailies, the Lianhe 
Zaobao, Lianhe Wanbao and the Shin Min Daily are the Mandarin dailies, the Berita 
Harian and Berita Minggu are the Malay dailies and the Tamil Murasu is the only 
Tamil newspaper (Singapore Press Holdings, n.d.). 
When Singapore became an independent nation in 1965, she faced a number of 
problems. The first was how the government was to go about building a national 
identity, the second was the need to fonnulate a strategy to ensure t:1e survival and 
prosperity of the island. The third problem was how to deal with the Communist 
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activities quite rampant at that time, and finally, the government had to find a way to 
retain its support from the people. 
Newspapers were a battleground of sorts between the People's Action Party 
government and the subversive groups who tried to undennine the government (Chua, 
1998, p.l47), and the way to win the war was to ensure strategic advantage on this 
battleground. The PAP was aided by requirements enacted by the British in 1948, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, which gave provision for the revocation of print 
licenses should the media owner break rules on press criticisms of government policies. 
This provision was further strengthened with the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act of 
1972 (Chua, 1998, p.l46), which was drafted to ensure that the press in Singapore 
remained in Singaporean hands so as to eliminate the possibility of 'black operations'-
foreign cash being used to influence domestic politics. 
These legislations, together with the Internal Security Act (which allowed 
detention without trial), enabled the government to crack down on newspapers like the 
Eastern Sun, the Singapore Herald and the Nanyang Siang Pau in 1971. Aw Kow, the 
owner of the Eastern Sun, was lent S$3 million dollars after secretly negotiating with 
high-ranking officials of a People's Republic of China agency based in Hong Kong. The 
condition of the loan was that the paper would not oppose mainland China on any major 
issues. Known more as a playboy than a businessman, the paper suffered heavy losses 
due to financial mismanagement. When the PAP exposed this black operation, the 
paper's staff resigned, forcing the paper to close down (Lee, 2000, p.188). 
Like the Eastern Sun, the Singapore Herald was also a black operation, accused 
of 'taking on' the government by 'eroding the will and attitudes of the people' and 
advocating pennissiveness and promiscuity (Hachten, 1993, p.72). The new~paper was 
a wholly foreign-owned newspaper which employed local staff. Lee wondered why a 
newspaper owned by two foreigners would work up issues such as national service and 
freedom of speech against the PAP. The paper exhausted its S$2.3 million working 
capital, and the Internal Security Department (lSD) reported that the Singapore 
Herald's largest shareholder was a Hong Kong finn registered under two dummy names. 
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On querying the newly appointed Singaporean editor who had put up money for 
the paper in the name of Heeda & Company of Hong Kong, it was revealed that the 
money actually came from Douald Stephens, the Malaysian High Commissioner to 
Canberra and fanner chief minister of the state of Sabah in Malaysia. Stephens' 
explanation was that his sole intention of investing in the Singapore Herald was to build 
u retirement fund on which he could live on in his later years. Lee Kuan Yew was 
unconvinced that Stephens would risk a million dollars investing in a paper which "took 
on" the Singapore government (Lee, 2000, p.l89}. The newspaper's license to print was 
withdrawn in 1971. 
Aside from curtailing foreign influence, there was also the need to keep 
pressures from within in check. There was a sense of foreboding in the Chinese-
language newspapers due to the growing popularity of English as a medium of 
instruction in schools at the expense of Chinese education. In April 1971, Lee accused 
the Chinese press of stirring up chauvinism in the treatment of this issue, and had three 
senior Nanyang Siang Pau executives arrested for "a deliberate campaign to stir up 
Chinese racial emotions" (Turnbull, 1995, p.291). The Nanyang Siang Pau continued to 
operate as an independent newspaper, until its merger with the Sin Chew lit Poh to fomt 
the Singapore News and Publications Ltd (SNPL) m 1983. 
The Jawi-script Utusan Melayu was banned from distributing in Singapore in 
1971 for allegedly inciting racial passions the previous year. The paper also participated 
in inflammatory reporting 20 years earlier which contributed to the outbreak of the 
Maria Hertogh Riots of 1950. 
Within the English-language newspaper market, The Straits Times would 
emerge as the undisputed victor, having dominated the market for over 130 years (as of 
the 1970s). Despite its thorny relationship with the PAP during the 50s and 60s, the 
paper did not suffer the same fate as the Eastern Sun and the Singapore Herald. Its 
editorial policy was always one of fair and measured criticisms, which would have 
stood out in contrast to the invective that so riled Lee in the pages of the Eastern Sun 
and the Singapore Herald. 
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July 1984 saw the merger of the SNPL, the Straits Times Press and Times 
Publishing to fonn Singapore Press Holdings. This merger effectively meant that all 
English, Chinese and Malay newspapers in the city~state would be produced by a 
monopoly company. A PAP critic may say that this merger makes it easier for the PAP 
to 'deal with' errant newspapers, since it could not throw its full weight on just one 
company instead of having to divide its efforts to pressure several companies. However, 
Turnbull (1995, p.349) points out that there were powerful economic reasons for the 
merger. Given Singapore's small population, it would be a daunting task for a 
newspaper company to compete with many others for readership in a small market. 
There were obvious advantages in cooperation due to the scarcity of resources. 
Consensus Politics 
With rising education levels and greater exposure to liberal ideas from abroad, 
the PAP acknowledged that the days of non~participatory politics were drawing to a 
close. A survey run by The Straits Times in 1990- the year when Lee Kuan Yew stepped 
down from the office of Prime Minister- revealed that 42% of respondents wanted more 
say on national issues, and 18% voiced extreme dissatisfaction at the amount of 
influence they were able to exercise (Birch, 1993, p.lO). 
When Gob Chok Tong took office as the Prime Minister of Singapore, he 
promised the city~state a more participatory style of government, calling on his "fellow 
citizens to join me, to run the next lap together" (Birch, 1993, p.11 ). Hence one of the 
ways the government achieves consensus through the press is to portray Singapore as 
being involved in a race with other countries. What is at stake is the future prosperity of 
Singapore, and the race can only be won if the people rally around the Prime Minister. 
The press can therefore work with the government to build a national consensus 
by being a platform from which the government can educate the public on upcoming 
policies. Under this approach, the press is assumed to act as a moral authority in which 
its agenda is shaped by a politic_i discourse that promotes national, not individual 
values (Oon, 1996, cited in Birch, 1998, p.338). In an editorial, l11e Straits Times points 
out that "consultation carries with it a cost" (Birch, 1993, p.10). The trade-off is that 
policy-making would take a longer time, but the exercise is worth it "if it leads to better 
governance and if it makes policies and laws more acceptable to Singaporeans" (Birch, 
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1993, p.lO). However, consensus politics is not easy to achieve, because in Lee Kuan 
Yew's view, "lJeople's desires were often incoherent and contradictory" (Birch, 1993, 
p.9). 
A more effective method of creating consensus would be the inculcation of 
'shared values' among the people- if everyone held on to the same beliefs as the ruling 
party, then convincing the population of accepting government policies would not be 
much of a problem. 
The concept of Shared Values was first mentioned in October 1988 by the then 
First Deputy Prime Minister Gob Chok Tong. Presented to Parliament in 1991, its 
intention is "to sculpt a Singaporean identity by incorporating the varjous parts of our 
various cultural heritages as well as the attitudes and values which have helped us 
survive as a nation". In addition, the Shared Values would be a "safeguard against 
undesirable values penneating from more developed countries which may be 
detrimental to our social fabric" (Quah, 1999, p.l17). The Shared Values is therefore a 
form of "cultural inoculation" against undesirable influence, as Senior Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew puts it (Han eta!., 1997, p.436). The Shared Values are: 
• Nation before Community and Society above Self 
• Family as the basic unit ofsociety 
• Regard and community supr -,rt for the individual 
• Consensus, not conflict 
• Racial and religious harmony (Quah, 1999, p.118) 
Consensus, not conflict and racial and religious harmony 
It is clear that the Shared Values do define what some of the OB markers are, the 
most obvious being that of 'consensus, not conflict' as well as 'racial and religious 
harmony'. As illustrated in Chapter I, religious intolerance led to chaos in the city-state, 
and so discussions which could arouse racial and religious passions fall within the out-
of-bounds category and excluded from public discourse. 
'Consensus, not conflict' complements the idea of putting nation and society 
before self. However, it should be noted that this shared value does not invalidate the 
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reasons for the existence of opposition parties. As Quah (1999, p.96) points out, the 
PAP has to objectively assess any negative responses of its policies from the oppo;:;ition. 
Nation before Community and Society above Self 
With the reminder that the good of the nation overrides the needs of the 
community and the individual, it can therefore be interpreted - within the OB markers 
framework - that discussions of political issues which may cause division with the 
nation are prohibited. As the PAP is now seen as synonymous with Singapore, any 
attacks and unfair criticisms against the party is also seen as an attack on the viability of 
the state. 
Family as the basic unit of society 
While the sanctity of the family unit is not unique to Singapore, the PAP 
believes that a stable family is a fundamental bedrock for the foundation of a healthy, 
strong society, without which Singapore cannot hope to remain as economically 
competitive should her population be beset with social problems. Publications deemed 
to threaten the idea of 'family' are banned, such as Cosmopolitan, which allegedly 
promotes sexual promiscuity. Casual sex and single parenthood aside, the Singapore 
government has frowned on homosexual relationships. 
Gay couples are not legally recognised in the city-state; and altough there is no 
law governing sexuality, the Singapore Penal Code criminalises same-sex intercourse as 
mmatural sex and gross indecency (People Like Us, 1999). While it is not clear whether 
discussions on homosexual issues are deemed out-of-bounds,. there seems to be a 
marked absence of any such topics in the mainstream Singapore media. Gay groups in 
Singapore have then turned to the Internet to exptess their views and opinions. 
Although the shift in leadership style of the PAP from a paternalistic (1959 to 
1984) to a consultative style (after 1984, when the PAP brought in new blood into its 
ranks) is a relatively recent event. the groundwork for consensus politics had been laid 
in those 'paternalistic' years. 
A decisive leader like Lee Kuan Yew was needed to bring the disparate 
communities together in the common fight for survival. The P .AP had established a 
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proven track record for economic development leading to higher standards of living and 
employment and in doing so, it gained the confidence of the people. At the same time, 
the leadership knew that Singaporeans were no longer content to take the PAP's every 
word at face value. Knowing that their position was ::::cure, the PAP then decided that it 
was time to change its style of administration. 
Birth of The Straits Times 
Contrary to popular belief, The Straits Times was not established by the People's 
Action Party to be a mouthpiece for the government. Turnbull (1995, p.lO) points out 
that little is known as to how the paper was initially conceived, but the commonly 
accepted explanation was that it was set up by an Armenian named Catchick Moses. 
The Straits Times was launched in 1845, with Robert Carr Woods, an English journalist 
from Bombay, as the editor. 
The commencement of a regular monthly steamship service in 1845 and the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1859 speeded up communications between Britain and her 
Southeast Asian colonies. The Straits Times CCiuid now offer a "new type of paper, 
bringing foreign news to Singapore and keeping its [European] readers in touch with 
'Home"' (Turnbull, 1995, p.l6). 
The fledgling newspaper initially suffered from "a deficiency of interesting 
matter" to fill the pages as well as financial woes, but grew from strength to strength 
after 1849. The Straits Times was revitalised that year with its first political controversy 
revolving the high-handed actions of Sir James Brooke, the pioneer White Rajah of 
Sarawak. 
The Straits Times' growth is due to good management by its (mainly expatriate) 
editors and board of directors. The only time when the paper had to cease production 
was during the 3Yl year Japanese occupation of Singapore. It was revived on 7 
September 1945, jubilantly declaring that "Singapore Is British Again". With the British 
Military Administration (BMA) in place, the newspaper quickly adopted a watchdog 
role, but was always mindful in ''taking a positive attitude, boosting morale by reporting 
achievements, supporting the authorities in their efforts to restore a normal regime, but 
finn in criticisms of shortcomings" (Turnbull, 1995, p.136). 
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Throughout its later history, The Straits Times faced no credible threat since the 
other competing English-language newspapers were short·lived, owing mainly to the 
drying up of their funds and the inability to compete with such an entrenched institution 
as The Straits Times. 
Turnbull (1995) repeatedly points out that while the paper may criticise certain 
govem:nent policies, it was never its intention to attack officials on a personal level or 
shake confidence in the administration. An editor once argued that sometimes they had 
a duty to criticise the government, but in doing so they also had a duty to uphold it. The 
paper upheld the colonial system and took great care not to offend individuals, in 
particular members of the establishment. 
The Straits Times was, and still is, a paper with a clear policy of cooperation 
with the government; regardless of whether the current administration was British, or 
locally elected. Given the rise of nationalism in the 1950s and 60s, the paper was caught 
in a crossfire between the outgoing colonial regime and the incoming nationalists, with 
the PAP declaring that The Straits Times was nothing more than the mouthpiece of the 
colonial government. 
Marching to the Beat of tbe PAP Drum 
Lee (2000, p.185) points out that in the 40 years after 1949, the Singapore press 
had evolved away from the nonns set by the colonial government. Previously, 
vernacular papers catered mainly to their readers' interests in their respective 
communities, and did not possess any Singaporean identity. The press in Singapore 
prior to the 1970s remained fragmented in their interests and did not fonn any cohesive 
picture what being a Singaporean was. Reporters seemed to hop from one paper to 
another in Singapore, and local journalists in the English-language newspapers had been 
influenced by the British editors and reporters who used to be their superiors in the 
Straits Times group. 
According to Lee (2000, p.185), it took many years before a you'lger generation 
of journalists in the 1980s recognised that the political culture of Singapore was, and 
will stay, different from the Western model. However. Singaporean journalists are 
exposed to, and influenced by, the reporting styles and political attitudt:s of the Anglo-
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American media which sees its role to be antagonistic to government in fulfilling its role 
as the Fourth Estate. While investigative journalism is regarded as the highest fonn of 
Anglo-American journalism, the Singapore press tends to report the facts as provided by 
government and other newsmakers, with little;; or no commentary. As far as 
commentaries or columnists are concerned, the laying down of the OB markers ensur~s 
that local journalists do not get carried away with criticisms of the ruling party. 
The Chinese and Malay press do not model themselves on the West - their 
culture being one of constructive support of policies they agreed with, and criticism in 
measured doses with those they disagreed with (Lee, 2000, p.l85). They placed greater 
emphasis on the interests of the group, rather than those of the individual. 
Unlike newspapers such as The Straits Times, which obtained funding from 
commercial and gov,~mment bodies, the Chinese-language press were left to their own 
devices. The weal tiN Chinese merchants who owned them used their papers as vehicles 
for their own gains, and often played up news about China, Chinese education and 
culture in order to attract readership. The Nanyang Siang Pau and the Sin Chew lit Poh 
were the two main Chinese papers. They were owned by wealthy Chinese families, 
whose right-wing editors worked through young Chinese journalists, many of whom 
were left-wing and activists for the Communist Party. 
When the main English-language newspaper The Straits Times was owned by 
the British, it openly promCJted the interests of the British commercial finns and the 
colonial government who were the patrons of the paper. No local English-language 
paper could attain even a fraction of The Straits Times' circulation and influence. 
According to Lee (2000, p.l86), The Straits Times was "bitterly hostile" to the 
PAP almost from the start. Apparently, it saw the non-communist leadership of the PAP 
as nothing more than a Trojan Horse for the Chinese-speaking communists. This was 
due to the fact that the PAP was a united front with the communists (at that time) and 
had socialist policies. Furthermore, the Chir.ese-language newspapers were strong 
supporters of the PAP, and as mentioned, many of the Chinese journalists were pro-
communist and therefore approved of PAP policies (Lee, p.l86). The Straits Times saw 
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the PAP as a party divided and challenged the "plausible myth" of a rock-solid 
organisation, claiming that it was dominated by the left (Turnbull, 1995, p.201). 
The Straits Times therefore expected and hoped for a Progressive Party victory 
in the 1955 elections. Like the rest of the business community, the paper saw the 
Progressives was most likely to provide stability and economic balance in the transition 
to self-government, and ultimately independence (Turnbull, 1995, p.199). The 
newspaper had plenty of anti-PAP material to print, since the three PAP assemblymen 
were under constant attack from opposing ministers and the government. An outspoken 
PAP left-winger Lim Chin Siang denounced The Straits Times as hostile to the people 
and a mouthpiece of British interests (Turnbull, p.201). 
In 1956, the paper supported the British administration's arrest of left-wing 
extremists· and challenged the PAP's claim to be non-communist. A column entitled 
"The Tragedy of Harry Lee p .. nnted out Lee Kuan Yew's anomalous position in a left-
wing party. Bartlett, the columnist said, "He thinks more as a British socialist than as a 
Chinese communist. .. his ambition and his impatience have put him in the wrong party" 
(Turnbull, 1995, p.202). 
Given that The Straits Times was also a journal of commerce and enjoyed the 
support of the mercantile community in Singapore, it is not surprising that the paper 
would look unfavorably on the PAP, which in its opinion, posed a threat to Singapore's 
reasons for existence - free trade and enterprise. According to Lee, the daily tried to 
prevent the PAP from winning the elections and forming the government (Lee, 2000, 
p.l86). 
The animosity generated between the PAP and The Straits Times during the 
election campaign finally came to a head, when Lee fired his "first salvo" on Aprill5111 
1959, two weeks before polling day. Lee declared that it was no secret that the paper's 
editorial staff would "scoot" to Kuala Lumpur, and warned "if people were trying to 
hann us, we will give them as hard as they give us" (Lee, 1998, p.298). In another 
warning issued a month later, Lee told the press that any newspaper which tried to sour 
relations between Singapore and Malaya will go in for subversion. Any member of the 
newspaper's staff found doing so would be taken in under the Preservation of Public 
School of Communications and Multimedia Honours Thesis 
Chapter Two: The Creation of Consensus 39 
Security Ordinance (the colonial predecessor of the current Internal Security Act): "We 
shall put him in and keep him in" (Turnbull, 1995, p.216). 
The decision for The Straits Times to move from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur 
was made for economic and political reasons. The Malayan capital was centrally located, 
facilitating speedier distribution. The government in Malaya had pledged to preserve a 
free enterprise economy, and thus offered a stable and attractive environment. By 
contrast, Turnbull says, Singapore politics seemed to be heading further left. The certain 
victory of the PAP in the 1959 elections made it all the more urgent for tJ-.e paper to 
"move out of harm's way" (1995, p.214). By March 1959, the move to Kuala Lumpur 
was completed, barely two months before the PAP come to power. 
In the eyes of Lee Kuan Yew, The Straits Times was a foreign-owned paper. 
This explains why his stance was particularly harsh. Lee (2000, p.187) says that the 
PAP had to tolerate criticisms from locally owned papers and accepted their bona fides 
because they had to stay and suffer the consequences of their policies. He stresses that it 
is the declared policy of the People's Action Party that newspapers should not be owned 
by foreigners. As quoted in Turnbull (1995, p.217), Lee states that: 
The folly of allowing newspapers to be owned by people who are not 
citizens or nationals of the country, is that their sense of responsibility is 
blunted by the knowledge that if the worst came to the worst, they could 
always buzz off to some other place. Hence the clear-cut distinction in 
our attitude to locally owned or controlled press and foreign-owned or 
controlled press. 
Leslie Hoffman, a Eurasian editor-in-chief, argued that the paper could not be 
considered as "foreign-owned or controlled", since ordinary shareholders were local 
people. Declaring that he was no "bird of passage", Hoffman announced his intention to 
remain in Singapore despite the threats of having the Preservation of Public Security 
Ordinance used against him (Lee, 2000, p.l87). A day before polling day, Hoffman 
departed for Kuala Lumpur, a move widely interpreted by the government and his 
colleagues as a flight from PAP threats (Turnbull, !995, p.219). 
Having achieved internal self-government in 1959, with an elected legislative 
assembly and control of its domestic affairs, the pe~v fanned PAP government was 
preoccupied with more pressing problems that to make good its threats against The 
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Straits Times. A representative from the International Press Institute (IPI) concluded 
that Lee Kuan Yew had overreacted and the paper had in turn "over-dramatised the 
threat". The representative concluded that the affair was no more than a "regrettable 
incident" during the electoral campaign which had been exaggerated on both sides 
(Turnbull, 1995, p.221). 
According to Turnbull (1995, p.221), Lee's interpretation of the whole affair 
was that the paper lacked political judgment from the start. Lee felt the expatriate 
managers and the local senior English-educated editorial people had failed to see that 
the constitutional changes in 1955 signalled the end of an era. The pro-independence 
movement sweeping through Southeast Asia meant that Singapore would no longer rely 
on the British for her continued prosperity in the long te-TI. 
Lee described the paper as only "skimming the surface of the English-educated 
middle class', while the PAP had to go deeper into "colder waters and more difficult 
waters" to convince Chinese-educated masses to support the plans for merger with the 
Federation (Turnbull, 1995, 219). It could have made the prospects for the (ill-fated) 
merger between Singapore and Malaya more difficult, and that was a sore point for the 
PAP. 
Mindful of how the press can play a critical part in nation-building, Lee Kuan 
Yew addressed the Singapore Union of Journalists in 1959 about the constructive role 
the English-educated would have to play in a new Singapore. However, the relationship 
between the PAP and the newspaper had already been soured during the 1959 election 
campaign, and Lee would continue his critical attitude towards the press. 
Singapore's ejection from the Federation shattered The Straits Times' ambition 
of being the 'national newspaper' of one single nation. As surprised as the paper was at 
the news of the separation, it continued to circulate in both countries, announcing that it 
was time for "healing and the soothing of wounds" (Turnbull, 1995, p.260). The paper 
would continue to be a Malaysian registered company with a Singapore financial base 
for seven years, until 1972 when The Strcits Times returned to being a Singapore listed 
company. 
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The 'cleaning up' of the Singapore press in 19711eft The Straits Times as the 
only English~language newspaper in the republic. In the aftermath, the press was 
subdued in its reporting, with reporters from the Chinese papers calling official contacts 
before writing their stories and young journalists from The Straits Times producing 
bland copy which read like government propaganda. Turnbull (1995, p.299) points out 
that the trauma the PAP faced over the other papers softened the government's !.lance 
with the paper, and since moving back to Singapore and being a publicly~listed 
company headed by Singaporeans, The Straits Times would most likely receive more 
favourable consideration (p.307). 
However, the differences between the paper and the government still remained, 
and a dispute arose over Lee Kuan Yew's annoyance at an alleged bias shown by The 
Straits Times in favour of the opposition during a by~election in 1979. Lee upbraided 
the daily for treating the elections like a "cockfight" (Turnbull, 1995, p.329). Matters 
came to a head when in 1981, the PAP lost a seat to an opposition member for the first 
time in 13 years. Lee Kuan Yew was furious at the paper, blaming its election coverage 
and reports of an intended rise in bus fares for the loss of the seat to Worker's Party 
leader J. B. Jeyaretnam. It was the PAP's longstanding view that The Straits Times was 
out c/'tune with the times and r.eeded reorganisation~ with help from the government ~ 
if it could not put its house in order. 
Fearing direct government intervention similar to the recent reorganisation of the 
transport system, the paper requested an interview with Lee. A compromise was reached 
whereby a government nominee, ac~eptable to the newspaper, would be appointed 
executive chairman of T11e Straits Times. In 1982, S. R. Nathan (currently Singapore's 
elected President), who was then about to retire as permanent secretary to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, was appointed to the position. Opposition member Jeyaretnam 
claimed that after losing the by~election, the government decided to move its censor into 
the paper, leading to a clampdown on news or views contrary to the government's 
policies (Turnbull, 1995, p.335). 
Nathan's job, however, was not to act as a censor, but to build bridges between 
the paper and the government. His brief was very general: guide and help the editors, 
who were paid to produce the paper, to understand the positions from where PAP 
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policies were coming from and to show the paper what its mission was. Morale was so 
low in The Straits Times that Nathan decided to lead from the rear and stay off the 
newsroom floor. However, Nathan did intervene in the coverage of international news 
in the editorial columns. As a former pennanent secretary of the Ministly of Foreign 
Affairs, he was accustomed to taking pre-emptive action to avoid misunderstandings 
(Turnbull, 1995, p.34!). 
In an effort to dispel the notion that he was the government appointed watchdog 
and censor-in-chief, Nathan organised a seminar for senior editors. Expecting a 
brainwashing session, the editors were instead asked to give comments after Nathan 
opened the proceedings by explaining now officials and senior ministers viewed the 
paper. As a bridge-builder, Turnbull (1995, p.339) asserts that Nathan was largely 
successful in establishing friendly contacts between the paper and the government. 
In January 1987, Cheong Yip Seng was appointed editor-in-chief of English and 
Malay newspapers and Leslie Fang editor of The Straits Times. Both men were firm 
supporters of the government and had spent their working lives in the Straits Times 
group. Having lived through the turbulent years of the 50s and 60s, they appreciated the 
achievements of the PAP. The Far Eastern Economic Review commented that their 
appointments would mean more pro-PAP journalism (Turnbull, 1995, p.364). However, 
the paper carried a good deal of constructive comment in the years that followed, with 
Fang claiming that he had "brought back responsible, honest disagreement into the 
newspaper" (Turnbull, p.J64). 
Conclusion 
The PAP had enacted tough laws and had taken action to ensure that the 
Singaporean press supported nation-building instead of undermining it. The press in 
tum accepts that it is not the Fourth Estate. In Lee Kuan Yew's own words, "You must 
accept that you are not in the position to set the OB markers" (Turnbull, 1995, p.387). 
While press freedom advocates may accuse the Singaporean government for 
stifling dissent, it has to be noted that the editorial policy of The Straits Times is to toe 
the government line (be it colonial or PAP). The daily's traditional style of reporting has 
always been "accurate but restrained and constructive" (Turnbull, 1995, p.283). 
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Prior to 1977, there was no written editorial policy, just a general understanding 
among the journalists of the paper's philosophy. But in 1977, The Straits Times' board 
of directors felt that they should define an editorial policy to promote national 
development (Turnbull, 1995, p.316). It was decided that the editorial policy should first 
infonn in a serious vein and from a Singaporean perspective, stressing opinions which 
supported national aims, but also avoiding being a mouthpiece of the government. The 
supportive role the paper has ascribed to is taught to every new journalist during the in~ 
house Basic Reporting course, where they learn that the newspaper's role is 'to infonn, 
educate, and entertain' (Tan, 2002a). 
The next chapter will explore three cases at different points of the PAP's 
administration of Singapore. A qualitative analysis of each of these cases would reveal 
the amount of commentary possible in the coverage of each case. The results of the 
analysis would them help to ascertain of the OB markers have widened or not. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Shifts in the OB Markers 
The first two chapters focused mainly of the historical conditions which have led 
to the introduction of the OB markers, as well as the laws in the republic which have 
brought the press- The Straits Times in particular- under the wing of the ruling p~y. 
The daily has thus been ignominiously labelled a PAP lapdog and a party paper. 
However, there certainly is room in The Straits Times for voicing one's discontent, 
albeit in a measured tone. 
In this chapter, qualitative analysis will be performed on articles appearing in 
The Straits Times over the past 15 years. Three incidents have been chosen, each case 
having been controversial, and coincided (or were close to) different periods of 
Singapore's administration by the PAP. They are: 
1. The Marxist Conspiracy, 1987. 
- Singapore was led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, under his 
paternalistic style of leadership. 
2. The Catherine Lim Incident, 1994. 
- Prime Minister Gob Chok Tong had been in office for three 
years, promising a "kinder, gentler" government. 
3. President Ong Teng Cheong's Press Conference, 1999. 
- Prime Minister Gob having administered for eight years, and 
President Ong was Singapore's first elected President. 
The analysis will look for: 
• depth of discussion! commentary 
• alternative views/ concerns raised 
• editorial conunents 
• reader response in the forum pages 
However, the absence of either one of the four points in the three cases will not 
be taken as a Jack of openness. Discussions on the overriding theme of each case would 
also reveal the degree of openness. The findings will help to determine, through the 
candidness of the articles, if the OB markers have shifted, and to what extent, in the 
years after Lee Kuan Yew handed his office over to Goh Chok Tong. 
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Marxist Conspiracy, 1987 
On the 21st of May, 1987, The futernal Security Department (lSD) detained 16 
people who were connected to a clandestine communist network. The Ministry of Home 
Affairs released details of the Marxist conspiracy in The Straits Times over four days 
from the 2ih to the 301h of May, revealing an elaborate network spanning the UK, 
Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and a terrorist training camp in Sri Lanka ("In 
action, at", 1987). Tan Wah Piow, a fanner student activist who had fled to Britain in 
order to evade national service was named as the mastermind. His plan was to establish 
a network of followers to prepare for his eventual return to Singapore (when Lee Kuan 
Yew was no longer Prime Minister), where he would establish a Marxist state ("Marxist 
plot uncovered", 1987). 
The intention was to subvert grassroots organisations ami radicalise them to join 
Tan's cause in order to establish a power base. As trade unions in Singapore were 
impossible to penetrate due "tight Government control" ("Vincent Cheng saw'', 1987), 
Tan's right-hand man Vincent Cheng, an active social worker in the Catholic Church. 
was aided by the other detainees in infiltrating church groups, student organisations, and 
the Worker's Party. They also set up the Third Stage- an English-language drama group 
used as a front to spread Marxist ideals. 
What shocked the country was the fact that those arrested did not fit the image 
of the "poor Chinese-educated" cadres of the 1950s and 60s. A majority of the detainees 
were "comfortably well-off English-educated graduates and professionals" ("Marxist 
plot uncovered", 1987); people who would have been the most unlikely to pose a threat 
to the establishment which would have given them a good life. Instead, many chose 
low-paying job which put them in rositions where they could influence other£:. 
Depth of discussion/commentary: 
The reports were based on the statements released by the Ministry of Home 
affairs with little or no commentary included. Given the importance of the case, The 
Straits Times devoted several pages to the reporting of the conspiracy for each day from 
the 27th to the 301h of May. The materials simply related factual information sur:h as: 
• who were the key players and those involved 
• what were the plans for subversion 
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• where the activities were carried out 
• when the infiltration was perfonned 
• why the Marxist network was set up 
• how religious and student organisations were manipulated 
Pictures and extensive write~ups on the key figures such as Tan Wah Piow (''Tan 
Wah Piow", 1987) and Vincent Cheng ("Vincent Cheng saw", 1987) were also included 
in the paper. Wllile the articles may seem one~sided since their source is a government 
ministry, the accusations against the Singapore government were also mentioned ("How 
religious organisations", 1987; "'Articles questioned value", 1987). The reports used 
terms such as 'conspiracy', 'infiltrate', 'subvert', 'clandestine', 'manipulate', 'instigate', 
and 'mastermind', giving the reader an impression that the Marxist conspiracy was 
insidious and posed a grave threat to national security. 
Alternative views/ concerns raised: 
The Catholic Church in Singapore voiced its concerns over the treatment of the 
detainees, many of whom were social workers and volunteers in church bodies and 
hoped that they were treated "justly and humanely" ("Church 'perturbed at"', 1987). In 
reply, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stressed that the details of the activities was not 
obtained "by torture, coercion or distortion of the truth" ("Archbishop accepts evidence", 
1987). In an effort to dispel the impression that th~ Church was Wlder attack, Lee stated 
clearly that the government strongly believed in upholding freedom of religion, but 
would not tolerate those who used any religion as a cover for subversion (''What we 
will", 1987), 
The statement from the Ministry of Home Affairs pointed out that the opposition 
Workers' Party has had a history of being infiltrated by communist elements, giving 
some examples of communist penetration of the party in the 50s, 60s and 80s 
("Infiltration ofWorkers'", 1987). However, the party secretary~general J.B. Jeyaretnam 
denied the claims, saying that the four detainees linked to his party were not members, 
but sympathisers of the party who shared the same cause ("Workers' Party denies", 
1987). 
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Editorial comments: 
The Straits Times was generally supportive of the arrests of the 16 conspirators, 
but did not lavish praise on the government for doing so. This is reflected in the 
moderate tone of the editorials, the first which addressed the issue asserts that there "is 
no substitute for vigilance". By giving a brief summary of the facts relating to the 
conspiracy, it also answered the question of whether the 16 detained "were merely do-
gooders whose only crime was tlmt they opposed some of the Government's policies" 
("Subversive designs", 1987). Another editorial pointed out that the arrests had led to 
speculation that the state would not tolerate opposing views and that it was a warning to 
religious organisations to stay away from political issues. It explained that the 
government was only taking action against a small group of leftists, and that ''the 
Church per se was not under attack" ("Church and State", 1987). 
Readers' response: 
The readers in general approved of the actions taken by the government to stop 
the Marxists before any harm could be done. Letters to the forum page denounced Tan 
Wah Piow and his followers, and some congratulated the Internal St:curity Department 
for a job well done (Rajenthir.e.n, 1987; Velge, 1987). One letter took the opportunity to 
state that Catholicism and communism are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable 
ideologies, the actions and sentiments of Tan and his followers were those of the 
Marxists and not representative of the Catholic Church (Venning, 1987). The general 
sentiment was that Singaporeans should not take national security for granted (Ng, 
1987). 
The Catherine Lim Incident, 1994 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's tenn of office had promised a more 
consultative style of government. However, allowing for more discussion in politics in 
the public sphere did not mean that it was 'open season' on the People's Action Party 
administration (Fernandez, 1995). Local author Dr. Catherine Lim published two 
articles in The Straits Times entitled The PAP and the people - A Great Affective Divide 
(The Straits Times, 1994 September 3) and One Government, Two Styles (The Straits 
Times, 1994 November20). 
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The PAP tolerated her first article which described the growing gulf between the 
ruling elite and the electorate (Lim, 1994a), but it took offence at what Lim had 
supposedly implied in her second article One Government, Two Styles- that Prime 
Minister Gob was not in full control of the government, with Senior Minister Lee 
intervening from ihe sidelines. Lim's hypothesis would mean that Prime Minister Gob's 
softer apnroach was not yielding results, and the administration was reveJiing back to 
the old-style, top-down decision process (Low, 1998, p.61; Ho, 2000, p.186). 
In a rebuttal to Catherine Lim's article, Prime Minister Goh described her 
comments as an erosion of his authority ("PM: No erosion", 1994). He declared that 
those who wished to comment on or influence policies should do so in the political 
arena, not from political sanctuaries ("There are limits", 1994). Singaporeans took this 
as a warning that those who spoke against the PAP would be treated like opposition 
party members. Dr Lim received only stern words from the government- a rap on the 
knuckles compared to the lawsuits which have been slapped on opposition members 
such as J.B. Jeyaretnam snd Dr Chee Soon Juan. 
What is significant about the Catherine Lim incident is that political watchers 
have questioned the government's promise and intention of openness and greater 
participation in the political arena. Critics would say that the PAP's response to 
Catherine Lim had seemed to prove her point that the government was reverting to its 
old authoritarian style of administration. 
Depth of discussion/commentary: 
The controversy over Catherine Lim's two articles sparked a lively debate in the 
pages of The Straits Times. Unlike the coverage of the Marxist Conspiracy - which 
reads like a monologue- the government, the public and The Straits Times journalists 
seem to be actively engaged in a dialogue, with views and opinions more freely 
expressed. 
While the paper has not strayed from its fonnula of factual reporting, there is a 
marked openness in what can be reported, more commentary from the journalists, as 
well as a change in the tone of the government, as compared to the previous case. In an 
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effort to address concerns raised by the public and state its point of view, the PAP is 
seen as engaging in a debate within the pages of the paper. 
One of Lim's allege.tions was that ministers were enriching themselves with the 
new pay proposal that tagged their salaries to what they would have been paid if they 
had been in the private sector and not in politics (Lim, 1994b). Having explained that 
the government and multinational companies were essentially dipping into the same 
talent pool, the new pay scale was a means of attracting the best and brightest into 
public service and to reduce the chances of corruption, Prime Minister Gob's rebuttal 
was, "What are your alternatives? What would you pay the minister? What kind of 
people do you want?" ("PM: No erosion", 1994). 
To dispel the notion that it did not welcome criticisms, the government stated 
clearly that it welcomes debate on its policies but will "rebut robustly arguments which 
are malicious, wrong or against the interests of the country" ("PM: Debate welcomed", 
1995). 
Alternative views/ concerns raised: 
In the article Politics for Politicians only written by Warren Fernandez, the 
News Editor for The Straits Times posed two questions which had arisen from the 
debate. He wondered if Dr Catherine Lim had been right about Prime Minister Gob's 
change of style, and more importantly, if the political arena was for politicians only- a 
sort of "sign-up-or-shut-up" policy (Fernandez, 1995). If that were the case, did it 
reflect a hardening of the government line on what is deemed as legitimate public 
debate, and what constituted political comment, he asked (Fernandez, 1994). 
Less than two months later, Fem;:udez wrote a follow-up article, PM's 
assurance should calm nervous commelltators, which addressed some of these questions. 
In response to the concerns expressed by the public and members of parliament, Prime 
Minister Gob assured the Parliament that the government welcomed debate on its 
policies, and that those who wished to air their views did not need to join a political 
party. However, the government made it clear that it reserved the right to respond, 
"robustly, if need be" to views which could undermine the country's interests. The 
underlying theme of the prime minister's statements, according to Fernandez (1995), 
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was that the PAP would not tolerate sarcastic, snide comments or mockery of the 
government. However, one question he asked, which remains unresolved, was who 
should be the judge what the right tone for comment is, and when does "well-meaning" 
commentary cross the line into obsequiousness. 
Readers' response: 
What was most interesting to observe was the sort of feedback sent from the 
readers to the Forum pages of The Straits Times. While there were moderate voices 
calling for more encouragement given to civic groups to engage in public debate, there 
were also those who did not agree with the PAP's rebuttals of Lim's articles. 
One reader, Wong Nai Seng, pointed out that a counter-argument given by Koo 
Tsai Kee, an MP, was flawed. Koo had written to the Forum page saying that the PAP's 
popularity could not be doubted as it had garnered over 60 percent of votes, and added 
that while the PAP was popular, it was not a populist party (Koo, 1994). Wong 
countered by saying that the votes were not an indication of unconditional support, and 
although the PAP may win overwhelmingly at every election, there can be much 
"discontent simmering underneath" (Wong, 1994). According to Wong, the citing of 
electoral data to support the PAP's populc.rity "smacks of self-delusion, and provides 
further evidence of the 'great affective divide"'. In parting, he says that the legitimacy 
of any government stems from its ability to win popular support, but cautioned that the 
people will not be led where they do not wish to go. 
The moderate voices were also of the opinion that the PAP had been harsh on 
Lim and her comments. One reader expressed his disappointment that the "PAP should 
deride her [Cathenne Lim] viewpoint and suggest that her analysis is badly flawed", 
when Lim was respected for her literary achievements and "has no political axe to 
grind" (Yap, 1994). Furthennore, another letter argued that Catherine Lim's articles 
were an indication that artists and writers have taken the Prime Minister's promise of a 
kinder, gentler Singapore seriously (Heng, 1994), and that the PAP should take criticism 
as a fonn of feedback and heed Lim's points (Chang, 1994). 
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Editorial comments: 
It would seem that the contentiousness of the issue prompted the editor of The 
Straits Times, Leslie Fang, to write an editorial himself. He is of the opinion that the 
level of public debate will go up a few notches if the participants were more adept at 
giving and receiving criticisms. Unfortunately, Fang says, many are prone to putting 
their ego on the line and letting their emotions get in the way of reason, and are blinded 
by fixations about people or ideas. These are indirect references to the PAP, which has 
been seen by many Singaporeans as being inflexible, dogmatic and hyper~sensitive to 
criticisms. With reference to the PAP, Fang (1995) says: 
... those in positions of authority, whether in government or other 
spheres of public life, who agree that more openness is a plus for 
Singapore provided it does not degenerate into licence or anarchy, 
should set examples for others. 
Being adept in handling criticisms, says Fong, calls for a willingness to hear out 
the other side, to accept facts, however unpleasant, and to let reason prevail over 
emotions. Although Fang did not pass judgment on Catherine Lim's articles or the 
reactions from the PAP, he cautions: "where criticism is informed and instructive, one 
would be a fool not to learn from it". What matters ultimately, he says, is that one's 
motive is pure. ''There must be a place in Singapore for fair and honeSt criticism" (Fang, 
1995). 
Despite the fears that the appointment of Fang would mean a more pro~PAP 
stance (Turnbull, 1995, p.361), his editorial write.up is fair and objective. It also has to 
be remembered that it was most likely Fang' decision to publish Catherine Lim's 
articles in the first place. After all, Fang is the one who claims to have "brought back 
responsible, honest disagreement into the newspaper" (Turnbull, 1995, p.364). Unlike 
the editorials commenting on the Marxist Conspiracy which basically toes the 
government line, this one has expressed the opinion that all parties, including the PAP, 
would do well to be more tolerant of alternative views and let reason be the guide. 
President Ong Teng Cheong's Press Conference, 1999 
Since Singapore's independence in 1965, the ruling People's Action Party has 
been seen as a rock~solid, united organisation. However, on July 161h 1999, little cracb 
appeared and the body politic was shaken by a move that was without precedent. At a 
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press conference held at the Istana (the offices of both the Head of State and Head of 
Government), Singapore's first Elected President (EP) Ong Teng Cheong announced 
that he would not be running for a second term. 
Stating that he had encountered a "long list" of problems, President Ong spoke 
tellingly of the difficulties he had encountered as the first Elected President. He cited his 
"disappointment" at not being able to use his 'second key' to the reserves, the differing 
opinions of how the Net Income Expenditure should be treated, the alleged reluctance of 
government departments to yield financial information to him ("Dr Hu clarifies" 1999), 
and added that some ministers and public offices had initially viewed his office as a 
"nuisance" as his role was being worked out (Ibrahim, 1999a, p.l ). 
The Elected President is essentially a custodial, not an executive appointment. 
The Elected President holds a 'second key' to the republic's reserves, can veto attempts 
to draw from it as well as ensure that key public sector positions are not given to 
incompetent people. When Lee Kuan Yew first mooted the idea of an elected President 
with enhanced powers, many assumed that the office was meant fer himself (George, 
2000, p.63). 
According to George (2000, p.58), the most remarkable thing about the press 
conference wru; Ong's initiative in summoning the media and disclosing his 
dissatisfaction. It attests to President Ong's belief that a public debate could be canied 
out in the media. His appeal to public opinion was a first for a serving head of state. 
Given the PAP's style of presenting a strong, united front in the administration of the 
republic, it is not surprising that the government was averse to having internal 
disagreements aired in public, especiaily one so fundamental as the role of the Elected 
President - the brainchild of Senior Minister Lee. 
It can be interpreted that President Ong's utilisation of the press in voicing his 
disagreements with the government shows that the PAP has been relaxing its grip on the 
newspapers. The fact that The Straits Times ran such extensive coverage of the incident 
and gave President Ong's opinions so much column space is a small but significant 
indication that the paper was no lapdog of the PAP, and would run stories that are 
pertinent to the interests of Singaporeans. 
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Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew was quoted as saying that it was ''perhaps as 
well" that the President chose to "vent his frustration", leaving the government with the 
"unpleasant task of having to rebut him in public". The positive aspect was that the 
exchanges had helped to clarify and educate the people on the role of the Elected 
President ("President's significant role", 1999). George (2000, p.60) asserts that it was 
probably the direct nature of the Elected President's relationship to the people that made 
President Ong feel that it was proper and justified for him to account for this term of 
office directly to the people. And since the Elected President had to be non-partisan 
(President Ong had to resign from the PAP before nomination), it implies that the 
Cabinet could not subject the El~cted President to internal party discipline or OB 
markers. It showed that Ong Teng Cheong was his own man when he held office, and 
did not always agree with the government despite being a fanner Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
Depth of discussion/commentary: 
President Ong's candid revelation of his 'long list of problems' was addressed 
by a point-by-point rebuttal from the PAP. While comments from the public and editors 
were not as forthcoming as the Catherine Lim incident, it was most interesting how the 
disagreement between President Ong and the PAP had unfolded in the reporting by The 
Straits Times. 
There are subtle hints which reveal more details if one reads between the lines. 
For example, one could sense President Ong's displeasure on the implication that his 
decision to run for a second tenn of office was affected by how the PAP viewed him. 
Ibrahim (1999a) writes: 
Probed on whether he had received signals or hints from the 
Government on how it viewed his re-election, he [President Ong] 
replied in clipped tones: "I don't need any support from anybody. It's 
my personal decision." 
The daily already had an extensive write-up on some of the main 'problems' on 
the day after the press conference was called. Obviously, The Straits Times was under 
no restraining order to prevent the publicising of the dispute. President Ong had taken 
the opportunity to have his say through the press, and the PAP then used this same 
forum to present their point of view about a month later on August 18. 
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Finance Minister Dr Richard Hu issued a point-by-point clarification on the 
problems described by President Ong. Dr Hu's ministerial statement said that the 
problems were "neither fundamental nor intractable" ("Dr Hu clarifies", 1999), and that 
the difficultie.; arose from "honest differences in views" which were inevitable in a two-
way learning process (George, 1999). 
Prime Minister Gob Chok Tong stated that the government had not shown 
President Ong any disrespect nor had they withheld any information or cooperation. He 
added that there was "absolutely no reason to obstruct" the Elected President, an 
institution created by the government which the PAP wants to see succeed 
("Government 'gave its'", 1999). 
Alternative views! concerns raised: 
While President Ong's appeal to the press did raise the hackles of the PAP, 
Prime Minister Goh made it clear that the government's reluctance to support Ong Teng 
Cheong for a second term in office did not stem from his disagreements with the 
government. An MP, Dr Michael Lim, asked pointedly for the prime minister to clarify 
his stand, since there was no compelling reason for the cabinet not to support President 
Ong for a second term unless Ong Teng Cheong's lymphoma had taken a tum for the 
worst ("Why Govt could", 1999). 
The Prime Minister felt that it was irrelevant and inappropriate to reveal 
President Ong's medical condition since he was not seeking re-election. But the calls to 
clarify the government's position left the prime minister no alternative but to release 
Ong's medical reports to the Cabinet ("Why Govt could", 1999), which then 
unanimously agreed that President Ong's health would prevent him from discharging 
his duties (Ibrahim, 1999b). Ong Teng Cheong, who passed away on 8 February 2002, 
would have been in the middle of his second term as President had he run for election 
and had been voted in. 
Questions were also raised on the nature of the 'independence' of the Elected 
President after President Ong' s press conference. Prime Minister Goh says in his 
statement that there is no confusion over the role of the Elected President, which is 
stated in the Constitution to hold only custodial powers whereas executive powers lie in 
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the hands of the government ("PM: I'm pained", 1999). In agreement, Senior Minister 
Lee states that the Elected President "has no executive powers to initiate anything nor to 
stop the government from doing anything other than spending reserves and making bad 
appointments" ("EP's role largely", 1999). SM Lee says that the commentators who 
expected the President to stand up against the government in the ordinary run of policies 
were thus mistaken on the role of the Elected President. 
Opposition Members of Parliament rose in umson to criticise the PAP's 
handling of the Elected Presidency issue. Worker's Party MP Low Thia Khiang asserted 
that the President's veto powers had been diminished since the government could 
unblock the President's veto with a two-thirds majority in the House. "The government 
gave the President the second key", says Low, "but changed the locks" ("Govt not 
sincere", 1999). 
Chua Lee Hoong, a Straits Times journalist covering a parliamentary session 
which saw a debate in the House over the Elected Presidency, says that the differences 
in opinion were a positive sign which "augers well for Singapore's political health", and 
that variety gives dynamism and sparks creativity (Chua, 1999a). She also notes that a 
more active debate over the Elected Presidency would have been good, since there were 
still issues to be resolved, much to the ire of the opposition MPs. Their dissatisfaction 
can be seen, as Chua quotes veteran opposition member J.B. Jeyaretnam as saying that 
the government should resign "to recover its credibility" because (according to 
Jeyaretnam) "the government had instituted something when it had no intention of it 
[the Elected Presidency] working" (Chua, 1999b). Chua (1999c) cautions readers from 
drawing the wrong conclusions from the Elected Presidency issue, one of which being 
that "the Elected President is doomed to non-respect and non-cooperation from the 
government". 
Readers' response: 
The public seemed to be less involved in the debate over the EP as compared to 
the Catherine Lim incident. Whether they were more contented in quietly reading the 
unfolding debate in the papers or deemed arguing the role of the Elected President as 
dangerous ground to tread, one can only speculate why this is so. 
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In the few letters which could be found, one suggested three possible candidates 
for the next presidential election (Abisheganaden, 1999). Another reader appealed to the 
government to fine-tune the EP selection process to ensure that there would always be 
eligible candidates to choose from (Ong, 1999). The Parliamentary Secretary of the 
Prime Minister's Office replied that no fine-tuning was necessary since pre-qualifying 
the candidates would ensure that any candidate standing for election will make a 
suitable President regardless if there was a contest or not (Chan, 1999). 
Editorial comments: 
The editorial following Prime Minister Goh's statements on President Ong's 
press conference seems to be in agreement with the sentiments of the PAP. What 
matters, according to the editorial, is that the elected Head of State is fulfilling his 
custodial role "conscientiously and effectively but quietly, working with the 
government to resolve any difference that may arise". It goes on to say that 
Singaporeans who demand "public assertiveness" as proof of the EP' s effectiveness 
should not be disappointed because how well the President does his job is more 
important than "how loudly he manages to convince citizens that he is doing it" 
("Getting the job", 1999). 
The editorial could be seen as disapproving of President Ong's press conference. 
However, it quotes newly elected President S. R. Nathan's comments as a reminder that 
the debate over the role of the EP arose because people were unaware that the EP's role 
was already defined in the Constitution. President Nathan says: 
Please bear in mind that the function that I am about to embark on is 
already defined under the Constitution ... There are certain parameters 
within which I have to work. ("Getting the job", 1999) 
The editorial does also acknowledge that the Elected Presidency was neither a 
wooden nor constricted role. It interpreted President Nathan's remarks that every 
presidency is a continual "moulding of the office", as the suggestion that the institution 
was one which was growing. 
Conclusion: A widening of the boundaries 
Using the Marxist Conspiracy as the yardstick, the coverage of the Catherine 
Lim case saw a marked increase in the range of opinions expressed by the newspaper's 
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journalists. In addition, letters to the Forum page did not mince d1eir words when it 
came to delivering criticisms of the PAP. While the ruling party was under fire for an 
about tum in its promise of a more consultative style of administration, it is important to 
note that the government had taken an open-dialogue approach and had engaged the 
public in a debate. Lim's alleged contravention of the OB markers of showing 
disrespect to the Prime Minister and casting doubts on the government's ability to rule 
did not mean that a discussion on where the OB markers lay was disallowed. It is 
unlikely that Lee Kuan Yew would have entertained such a debate, taking into 
consideration his aversion to noisy, protracted debates and his philosophy of 
"bulldozing" those out to block him (Ng, 1995a). 
Although the President is not subjecr to the OB markers as George (2000) points 
out, the media in Singapore is. However, The Straits Times was in no way prevented 
from reporting on President Ong's press conference and his di6agreements with the 
government. As mentioned above, the press in the republic does possess a certain 
amount of independence. It is not likely that the PAP were caught off-guard. If they so 
wished, they could have declnred the topic out-of-bounds for public consumption before 
the story went to print the next day. The PAP has always portrayed itself as a party 
united in its cause. While President Ong's comments may have implied the existence of 
fault lines within the government and "cast doubts on the government" ("PM: I'm 
pained", 1999), the ensuing debate served to educate the public on the role of the EP. 
However, this widening of the OB markers seems to have gone unnoticed by 
most critics of the PAP. While it is true that such moves towards openness are not great 
strides by the western standards, the PAP has stated that the widening of social and 
political space for Singaporeans is "best achieved through evolutionary, not radical 
change" ("Govt: Process of', 1994). The Singapore govenunent may be sceptical about 
the universality of human rights and the concept of press freedom enshrined within, but 
it does concur that greater freedom of expression in the media is beneficial to the 
country. 
Far from being rigid, the govenunent has exhibited flexibility and the 
willingness to heed the calls for greater public participation in national issues. On the 
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other hand, the conditions attached to moves towards openness are that the PAP will 
only do so in their own time, and on their own tenns. 
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CONCLUSION 
The OB markers in the Singapore media, which set the limits on how far public 
discussions can go, has been criticised as a device to curb freedom of speech and a 
muzzle on civil society. While there is no denying that their arbitrary nature leaves 
many commentators uneasy about unwittingly treading into areas deemed out-of-bounds, 
the PAP has stated that it welcomes debate and criticisms provided that it did not mock 
the government. 
Lee Kuan Yew had justified the need for setting boundaries in political 
discussions, citing the unique circumstances of Singapore's social, political and 
economic development and the frailty of inter-ethnic relations. The republic's 
inauspicious birth as a result of her ejection from the Federation of Malaysia placed her 
in a 'do-or-die' situation which propelled the country down a single-minded pursuit for 
survival. The hard lessons learnt from the press' insensitive reporting of the Maria 
Hertogh custody battle drove home the point that racial relations were fragile, and that 
good relationa had to be maintained at all costs. 
The OB markers were implemented with the aim of ensuring that discussions on 
race, religion and government did not pose a threat on the social and political 
cohesiveness of the city-state. While critics assert that the OB markers are an 
infringement on freedom of speech, the PAP sees it as one of the means of safeguarding 
the country's interests. In promoting the idea of the press being subordinate to the 
interests of nation-building, Lee's rejections of the Western journalistic nonns have 
drawn much criticism from liberals. 
However, it is necessary to point out that while the Singaporean system is not as 
open and liberal as her critics would like it to be, there are little pockets of freedom 
where dissenting voices can be heard. For example, the rese:rrch materials for this thesis 
were mainly drawn from ~ public library in Marine Parade - a large public housing 
estate in the eastern part of Singapore which is also Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's 
ward. Books delivering both bouquets and brickbats to the PAP can be found among the 
shelves. In his book To Be Free, Singapore Democratic Party leader Dr Chee Soon Juan 
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has painted a bleak picture of democracy in Singapore and the alleged physical and 
psychological abuse that political detainees suffer under the Internal Security 
Department (Chee, 1998, p.260). Christopher Tremewan, author of The Political 
Economy of Social Control in Singapore, asserts in the preface that the publication is 
banned in Singapore (1996, p.xi), which is untrue since it could also be found in the 
library. 
If the PAP was indeed that censorial a regime and intolerant of opposing 
viewpoints as others imagine it to be, books such as these would not be publicly 
available in the libraries or in bookshops. 
It is impossible to list exhaustively what the OB markers are- they shift 
according to the prevailing social and political circumstances in Singapore. Where there 
may be an opening up on discussions for a particular issue, there could be a contraction 
somewhere else. Many saw the introduction of the recent legislation which makes 
registration of political websites compulsory, as a means of suppressing dissent voiced 
·JVer the Internet ("Singapore tightens grip", 2001). 
However, other areas, which traditionally had been placed under tighter controls, 
are being liberalised. Singapore's strict censorship guidelines are put through a thorough 
review for the first time in 10 years in order to allow for more diversity and choice in 
the arts, an area that the government has identified as a growth industry ("Govt to ease", 
2002). 
Comedian Jack Neo has produced what may be Singapore's first political 
satirical film: I Not Stupid. The gr:unmatically incorrect title of the movie alone is a 
snub at the government's Speak Good English campaign. The movie delivers batt 
direct and indirect criticisms on government policies such as the foreign talent policy as 
well as the city-state's rigid school system. The references to the PAP are obvious, with 
a bossy mother dressed in white (as PAP politicians are during public events and 
Parliamentary sessions) and always reminding her children how lucky they are to have 
surh good and responsible parents. Neo said that he was not worried about his film 
being censored, because he knew it was a constructive way of criticising and had no 
political motivations (Yeo, 2002). 
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Although Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew had stated clearly that only those 
elected could set the OB markers (Ng, 1995b), Prof Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-Large 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Director of the Institute of Policy Studies in 
Singapore, believes that citizens should not be afraid to test the frontiers. As quoted in 
Tan (n.d.), ProfKoh says: 
Well, the politicians are unwilling to indicate clearly and in advance 
where the OB markers are so one would have to continue to test the 
frontiers. I guess in a situation like ours, which is evolving, to use a 
legal jargon, we can't use a civil law approach where the rules are 
clearly laid out but must use a common law approach where rules are 
evolved on a case to case basis. That means that some of us get beaten 
up from time to time when we transgress the OB markers. I guess 
intellectual [sic] should not be afraid to take risks, otherwise, how can 
you advance the cause if you are afraid of getting beaten up. 
The move towards greater openness has been accelerated by the fact that the 
current economic downturn in Asia, as well as increased competition with neighbouring 
countries has left Singapore in a vulnerable position. Coupled with the discovery of 
terrorist plots to undennine the republic and the wariness felt against the Singaporean 
Muslim community after comments given by outspoken Muslim radicals, it has led 
many to embark on a path of soul-searching, and to question lhe very fundamentals on 
which Singapore as a sovereign political entity rests. 
Much has changed since September 11, the event having dashed economic 
recovery in Asia after the 1997 economic crisis. \¥bile Singapore's economy siruggles 
to get back on track, the discovery of enemies from within has somewhat shaken 
confidence in the strength of the country's social fabric. The PAP knows that now, more 
than ever, it needs to listen to the people in order to reinvent itself to better prepare 
Singapore for an uncertain future. However, the government's track record of having 
dealt harshly with opposition members has made Singaporeans fearful of speaking out. 
The PAP has realised that the republic needs to reinvent itself in order to survive, 
and announced the fonnation of the Remaking Singapore Committee. The committee's 
job is to advise the government on how it is to go about changing Singapore socially, 
politically and culturally, so that Singapore would be in a better position to overcome 
the challenges in a changed world (Ministry of Community Development and Sports, 
2002). 
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Mr Vivi.'ln Balakrishnan, chairman of the Remaking Singapore Committee and 
Minister of State (National Development), says that it is important for people to say 
what is on their wish list for changes to be implemented in Singapore, because "this is a 
time when people [the gPvem.;ncnt] are more willing to listen than they have ever been 
before" (Tan, 2002b). 
The OB markers are in a continuous state of flux, just as social, political and 
economic relations change in the world. It does not have a definite shape or a distinct 
boundary. One can only tell where the OB markers lie when one probes and tests the 
limits. It may seem as an irony to some, that the government's push for openness and 
participation from Singaporeans comes at a time when the country faces its most serious 
challenge since independence. 
The Singaporean government has signalled that the OB markers have widened, 
and thus the ball is also in the Singaporeans' court. Their apprehension at speaking up is 
not unfounded, but if they are unable to overcome their 'kiasi' mentality and their 
scepticism at the PAP's calls for feedback, the game will lapse and evel)'one will be 
worse off. 
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